UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TORTS IN CHINA: A
POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE
Wei Zhang *
In this paper, I connect the text of the Chinese tort law with
the institutional context of lawmaking in China from a political
economy perspective. Two determinants, political influence and
populist pressure, were identified for the tort law legislation in China,
and a simple spatial model is presented to demonstrate the
mechanism through which these determinants might have affected the
text of the law. In particular, my research suggests that when
tortfeasors’ political influence is kept constant, the populist pressure
on the tortfeasor group tends to make tort law rules more favorable
toward victims. In contrast, with similar populist pressure, the
politically influential tortfeasors could mold legal rules to their
advantage. Even within a particular type of tort, the subgroup of
tortfeasors who were better organized to exert political influence
would be rewarded with more favorable tort rules than their less
organized fellow tortfeasors, especially where populist pressure was
moderate. Hopefully, this research will inspire more efforts among
students of Chinese law to explore the operation of law at the
microscopic level against the macroscopic institutional backdrop of
China.
Introduction
China’s new Tort Liability Law (Qinquan Zeren Fa) is the
last of the three pillars of civil law, together with Contract Law
(Hetong Fa) and Property Law (Wuquan Fa). But it is certainly not
the least in terms of its practical importance. A quick search of
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judgments publicized on the Shanghai Court Net shows, for example,
that during the four years after the Tort Liability Law became
effective on July 1, 2010, the Tort Liability Law has been cited in
33,746 judgments rendered in Shanghai. During the same period of
time, the number of judgments citing the Property Law, which took
effect almost three years earlier, was merely 10,796, less than a third
of the total citations of the former. 1 A few introductory works can be
found in the English literature on the Tort Liability Law, 2 but none of
them looked beyond the words of the law or delved into the impetus
behind its terms. 3 Indeed, there appears to be an inclination in the
Chinese law scholarship to study the text and the institutional context
of law in isolation. 4 Recently, more efforts have been made to
1

The search was performed on Oct. 13, 2014 at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn:8081/flws/.
The search conditions were biased against the Tort Liability Law by setting the
search period starting at the Law’s effective date. A newly implemented law could
not be applied to disputes occurring before its implementation, so the judgments on
those disputes closed soon after the effective date of the law were unlikely to cite
that law.
2
See, e.g., XIANG LI & JIGANG JIN, CONCISE CHINESE TORT LAW (2014)
(providing a multidimensional perspective to present a complete picture of Tort
Laws in China); MO ZHANG, INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE TORTS LAW (2014)
(providing a comprehensive review of the modern Chinese tort system through an
in-depth analysis of China’s Torts Law); Helmut Koziol & Yan Zhu, Background
and Key Contents of the New Chinese Tort Liability Law, 1 J. EUR. TORT L. 328,
328 (2010) (providing an overview of the most important provisions in China’s
Tort Liability Law). For a comparison between the Chinese and American Tort
doctrines, see Ellen M. Bublick, China’s New Tort Law: The Promise of
Reasonable Care, 13 ASIAN PIC. L. & POL’Y J. 36, 38-41 (2011) (addressing
similarities and differences between China’s Tort Liability Law and U.S. tort law
provisions and suggesting ways to improve both).
3
A recent paper on the medical malpractice disputes in China brought broader
sociopolitical insights to the study of part of the Tort Liability Law, although it was
mostly an inquiry into the implementation, rather than the terms, of the law. See
Benjamin L. Liebman, Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 253-54 (2013) (suggesting limitations to contemporary
understanding of both the functioning of the Chinese state and of the role of law in
China, and adding to existing literature on the non-convergence of the Chinese
system with existing models of legal and political development).
4
For a rare exception to this inclination, see MURRAY SCOT TANNER, THE POLITICS
OF LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES, AND
DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS, 167-204 (1999) (providing a case study on the Stateowned Industrial Enterprises Law (Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiye Fa) and
uncovering the competing interests giving birth to the pro-worker provisions of the
law). Tanner’s approach, however, differs from the public choice perspective of
this paper.
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account for the adjudicative behaviors of Chinese courts in certain
specific areas of law under the overriding political and economic
constraints, 5 yet such an institutional approach has not been amply
extended to examine the legislative activities conducted by the
various government entities in China. This academic shortfall is
probably a reflection of the long-standing suspicion about the
relevance of formal legal rules in authoritarian states. As detailed
below, however, formal rules can be more relevant in these states than
skeptics think.
To bridge this gap in the Chinese law scholarship, this paper
aims to connect the text of the Chinese tort law with the institutional
context in which the law was conceived. Inspired by the public
choice theories on lawmaking, 6 I will analyze the critical roles of two
factors in determining the orientation of tort law in China, the
political influence held by tortfeasor groups, and the populist pressure
aggregating against these groups. Specifically, my analysis posits
that the first determinant tilts the field toward tortfeasors while the
second favors victims. I will also introduce a model illustrating how
these determinants may play a part in China’s policymaking process.
Although the wisdom of public choice has been widely used to
explain legislative behavior in the United States, 7 to the best of my
knowledge, this research is the first endeavor to apply these insights
to a particular body of Chinese law.
My study contributes to the literature in four respects. First,
it provides new thoughts about the law in books under an
authoritarian regime. Obviously, formal legal rules in China should
not be taken at face value. But the willingness and ability of powerful
tortfeasors to extract rules of torts in their own favor, as demonstrated
below, offers empirical support to my argument that, even in
5

See generally Liebman, supra note 3 (medical malpractice); Rachel E. Stern, On
the Frontlines: Making Decisions in Chinese Civil Environmental Lawsuits, 32 L.
& POL’Y 79, 79 (2010) (environmental torts); Xin He, Routinization of Divorce
Law Practice in China: Institutional Constraint’s Influence on Judicial Behavior,
23 INT’L J. L., POL’Y & FAM. 83, 83 (2009) (divorce).
6
See infra Part III A (discussing the public choice theory of legislation that has
vastly enriched our knowledge about the impetus behind lawmaking).
7
See infra notes 65-66 (arguing that, while legislation can be consistent with the
public interest or general efficiency requirement, public interest is not the primary
concern in rulemaking and that the value of the public choice theory resides in the
guidance it offers to understand the habitual undersupply of laws championing the
public interest at the expense of well-organized pressure groups).
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authoritarian states, the formal law is more than sheer political
decoration and deserves careful examination. Second, the paper
reveals previously unnoticed driving forces behind China’s
legislation on torts. The political economy perspective creates a new
landscape for the study of Chinese law and enables a nuanced
understanding about the rhetoric of law in light of the political
realities of this nation. Third, this paper produces some academic
ingredients potentially useful for the general study of Chinese law,
including a spatial model delineating the political mechanism of
lawmaking and an index evaluating the political influence of Chinese
ministries. Finally, the analytical framework of this research joins
together the two prominent views on the Chinese legal system. On
the one hand, the system has long been considered to be politically
biased, 8 while on the other hand, many commentators believe it has
also been eroded by populism in the past decade. 9 By taking both
political influence and populist pressure into account, I intend to
highlight the interaction of the two aspects in directing the course of
lawmaking in China.
One caveat is in order before unfolding my analytical
framework. As the first attempt at a complex subject, this research
could not draw on rigorous data to test its theories simply because
such data do not exist. Despite my efforts to seek factual support for
the analysis, it remains a formidable task to objectively specify the
values of the key variables pertaining to the different types of torts
surveyed below. Hence, I cannot reject the possibility that the
apparent consistency between the observation and theory is a result
of the manipulability of the model. 10 This being said, “when the

8

For a comprehensive account of the political bias set in the Chinese judiciary, see
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW, 280-330
(2002). For empirical evidence of such bias, see Michael Firth et al., The Effects
of Political Connections and State Ownership on Corporate Litigation in China,
54 J. L. & ECON. 573 (2011); Xin He & Yang Su, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead
in Shanghai Courts?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120 (2013).
9
See infra note 23 (discussing China’s retreat from its claimed course toward rule
of law).
10
In this respect, my research shares the same weakness with other pioneering
studies on the political economy of legislation. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward and Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate
Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 509 (1987).
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theory and casual empiricism point in the same direction . . . the
intellectual burden of proof should shift.” 11
Part I sets out the scope of laws explored in this paper and
describes briefly the legislative history of the tort law in China. Part
II discusses the intellectual significance of looking into the formal
legal rules in general, and those of torts in particular, promulgated in
authoritarian countries like China. Part III develops the theoretical
framework of my research drawing on the public choice literature.
Part IV applies this framework to the Chinese tort law through a series
of comparisons of rules across different types of torts and disparate
categories of tortfeasors. A short conclusion follows Part IV.
I.

Creation of the Tort Law in China
II.
Before we start a political economy inquiry into the Chinese
tort law, it is essential to specify the laws to be examined in this study.
For practical purposes, we must probe three categories of legal
documents to have a clear picture of this field in Chinese law: general
statutes, special statutes, and judicial interpretations. Indeed, here
“law” is used in a broad sense, including any formal authority binding
in adjudication.
A.

Three Sources of Law

In China, at the national level, civil liability resulting from
tortious actions are governed by three distinct categories of laws:
general statutes, special statutes and judicial interpretations.
General statutes are comprehensive laws about tortious
behaviors. They lay down the basic rules applicable to various types
of torts. They are enacted either by the National People’s Congress
(NPC) or its Standing Committee and are officially titled as “law”
(falü), hence bearing the highest rank of effect among China’s official
sources of law. Usually, the NPC Legislative Affairs Work
Committee (fazhi gongzuo weiyunhui) under the Standing Committee,
a working body of the NPC, leads the drafting of general statutes. 12
The process may involve a long period of time during which a series
11

Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 599 (1995).
12
TANNER, supra note 4, at 102.
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of drafts are put forward and public opinions openly solicited for
some of these drafts. So far, there are two general statutes on torts,
the General Principles of Civil Law (Minfa Tongze, hereinafter as
“General Principles”) and the Tort Liability Law. The former was
passed by the NPC in 1986 and the latter by its Standing Committee
in 2009.
Special statutes are laws related to specific types of torts
conventionally referred to as “special torts” (teshu qinquan) by
Chinese lawyers. This name comes from the fact that strict liability
or res ips loquitur, instead of the regular negligence rule, is applicable
to these torts. In most cases, the special statutes do not deal with tort
liabilities in particular, but are regulatory rules for specific industries.
Some of these special statutes are promulgated by the NPC Standing
Committee, hence obtaining the status of “law.” Others are adopted
by the State Council and are administrative regulations (xingzheng
fagui), one rank lower than laws in terms of legal effect, or by the
ministries of the State Council as departmental rules (bumen
guizhang) with an even lower rank as a source of law. 13 Regardless
of their formal ranks, the ministry overseeing a certain industry often
plays a key role in drafting the special statutes regulating that
industry. 14 There are more than forty “laws” other than the general
statutes, and still more administrative regulations and departmental
rules, pertaining to tort liabilities. 15 All of them are deemed as special
statutes on torts in this paper.
Besides the rules enacted by legislative and administrative
institutions, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issues various judicial
interpretations on the adjudication of tort disputes. The SPC
interpretations either take the form of replies to requests of lower
courts for instructions regarding particular cases, or stand alone as
general directions on certain issues in tort litigations. Whereas the
former is usually short and written in an essay style, the latter is closer
to statutes in terms of format and generality. Although judicial
13

For the ranks of effect of the official sources of law, see Zhonghua Renmin

Gongheguo Lifa Fa (中华人民共和国立法) [PRC Legislation Law] (Aug. 1, 2001),
art. 79.
14
TANNER, supra note 4, at 120.
15
Wang Liming, SHENGMING WANG, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO QINQUAN
ZEREN FA SHIYI (中华人民共和国侵权责任法释义) [EXPLANATIONS OF THE
TORT LIABILITY LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 2 (2nd ed., China
Legal Publishing House, 2013).
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interpretations are not an official source of law, in practice, they are
routinely cited in court decisions—especially the statute-style general
directions—hence becoming a de facto source of law. SPC derives
its authority to issue interpretations in relation to the application of
laws and decrees in adjudications from a resolution passed by the
NPC Standing Committee in 1981. 16 SPC issues not only the general
provisions applicable to a wide variety of torts, but also judicial
interpretations on certain specific types of torts, such as traffic
accidents. The drafting of judicial interpretations is completed within
the SPC, sometimes with consultation with outside experts and other
government institutions. SPC also elicited public opinions for its
recent statute-style interpretations. However, the final adoption is not
subject to any external approval. 17 No exact number of SPC judicial
interpretations related to torts could be found during my research.
B.

A Brief History

Of the above sources of tort law, the oldest one is the General
Principles. 18 The SPC Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the
Implementation of the General Principles of the Civil Law (For Trial
Implementation) (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Guanche Zhixing
16

QUANGUO RENMIN DAIBIAO DAHUI CHANGWU WEIYUANHUI GUANYU

JIAQIANG FALÜ JIESHI GONGZUO DE JUEYI (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于
加强法律解释工作的决议) [THE NPC STANDING COMMITTEE RESOLUTION ON
STRENGTHENING THE WORK ON LEGAL INTERPRETATION] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 10, 1981), art. 2.
17

Meng Hou, Zuigao Fayuan Guizhi Jingji De Shizheng Yanjiu (最高法院规制

经济的实证研究) [An Empirical Study on the SPC’s Role in Economic
Regulation], 17-2 ZHONGWAI FAXUE [PEKING UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL] 203,
207-8 (2005). This was also confirmed in my interview with Judge ZJ. Interview
by Wei Zhang with Judge ZJ in Shanghai (July 20, 2014).
18
Before the introduction of the General Principles, the SPC issued the Opinions
on Several Issues Concerning the Implementation of Civil Policies and Laws
(Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Guanche Zhixing Minshi Zhengce Falü Ruogan
Wenti De Yijian) （最高人民法院关于贯彻执行民事政策法律若干问题的意见）
in 1984. Part 9 of this judicial interpretation is about tort damages. However, its
provisions are highly incomplete. It only contains a negligence rule for regular
torts and barely touches on the special torts. Besides, this documents is a mixture
of substantive and procedural rules. Thus, it is rarely regarded as the origin of the
Chinese tort law.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 11

178

“Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze” Ruogan Wenti De
Yijian (Shixing), hereinafter as “SPC Opinions”) was issued two
years after this piece of groundbreaking legislation took effect. Most
of its provisions can be seen as clarification of the rules in the General
Principles. While the earliest special statute pertaining to tort
liabilities appeared soon after the promulgation of the General
Principles, the boom of such statutes came in the first half of the
1990s. Judicial interpretations often follow the special statutes to
elaborate, and sometimes modify, the rules of the latter. The vast
majority of SPC interpretations applicable to tort litigation were
issued in the twenty-first century, especially in the early years of the
century. In addition, the SPC issued in 2001 Some Provisions on
Evidence in Civil Procedures (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu
Minshi Susong Zhengju De Ruogan Guiding, hereinafter as
“Interpretation on Evidence”) that exerted profound influence on tort
litigation by demarcating the burdens of proof. 19 Premised on these
prior legal documents, the Tort Liability Law was passed by the NPC
Standing Committee five days before the end of 2009 after a drafting
process spanning nearly a decade. 20
In a nutshell, the law of torts in China started with the General
Principles, inviting a wave of special statutes in the 1990s. These
were followed by a series of judicial interpretations in the 2000s
before they were consolidated in the Tort Liability Law that came
into effect on July 1, 2010. However, it is noteworthy that many of
the special statutes and judicial interpretations on torts remained
effective after the promulgation of the Tort Liability Law.
III.

Why Look at the Law of Torts in China?

The motivation of the current study is to link the text of the
law to the institutional context in which the law was created. This
assumes that the words of the legal documents are more than cheap
talk that can be ignored in practice. Therefore, the next two questions
have to be addressed prior to a meaningful inquiry into the political

19

Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Minshi Susong Zhengju De Ruogan Guiding

(最高人民法院关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定) [Interpretation on Evidence]
(promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 6, 2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002).
20
The earliest draft of the Tort Liability Law was submitted to the NPC Standing
Committee in December 2002.
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economy of Chinese tort law: 1) why look at the formal law in China,
an authoritarian state, and 2) why look at the law of torts?
A.

Why Look at the Formal Law in China?

Given the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime, many
will question the value of looking at the text of its formal statutes
since under such a regime what was written in books can be readily
bent in practice. Some commentators have stated that when the
chance of enforcement is remote, formal laws could be phrased in
more pro-the-masses rhetoric in China than in countries committed
full-heartedly to the rule of law. 21 Others portrayed the everyday
cases in China to be clustering under the rubric of “rough justice,”
meaning adjudications are more in accord with informal problem
solving strategies than the written laws. 22 From a broader perspective,
many are skeptical about the impact of the formal legal institutions
on China’s remarkable economic growth during the past three
decades, 23 and still more have written on China’s retreat from its
recently claimed course toward the rule of law. 24
21

Ji Li, When Are There More Laws? When Do They Matter? Using Game Theory
to Compare Laws, Power Distribution and Legal Environments in the United States
and China, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 335, 337-344 (2007) (recognizing, however,
that the formal law in authoritarian states would be more seriously applied where
the parties involved held comparable political status).
22
Stern, supra note 5, at 88-93.
23
Donald Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The
Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 1 (1996); Donald Clarke
et al., The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development, in CHINA’S GREAT
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 375 (Loren Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2008).
See also William P. Alford, The More Law, the More…? Measuring Legal Reform
in the People’s Republic of China, in HOW FAR ACROSS THE RIVER? CHINESE
POLICY REFORM AT THE MILLENNIUM 122 (Nicholas C. Hope et al. eds., 2003); Xin
He, Enforcing Commercial Judgments in the Pearl River Delta of China, 57 AM J.
COMP. L. 419 (2009).
24
E.g. Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011)
(arguing that Chinese leaders' shift away from formal law is a distinct domestic
political reaction to building pressures within the Chinese system); Hualing Fu &
Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil
Justice Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 25 (Margaret Y.K. Woo & Many E. Gallagher eds., 2011)
(discussing the shift of priority from adjudicatory to mediatory justice); Benjamin
L. Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality?: Historical Legacies and Legal Reform,
in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ADAPTIVE
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I do not dispute the strength of the institutional constraints
under which the law in books are implemented in China, but I contend
that it would be an oversimplification to sweepingly discredit the
pertinence of China’s formal legal rules. On the one hand, such
discredit stands at odds with the credible empirical evidence showing
China’s Communist regime is facilitating, rather than inhibiting, the
consolidation of its official legal institution. 25 On the other, critical
to the purpose of this paper, there is solid theoretical foundation to
believe that the formal laws in authoritarian states can do more than
showcase the hypocrisy of the regime.
In one of their influential papers, Professors Moustafa and
Ginsburg developed in detail the functions of courts as part of the
official legal institution in authoritarian politics, 26 and many of their
insights are applicable to the role played by formal laws in China.
For instance, formal legislation can serve as documents to declare the
policies cherished by the regime to achieve social control. As
Professor Damaška acutely pointed out, the law in an activist state
“springs from the state and expresses its policies,” and “it tells
citizens what to do and how to behave.” 27 Furthermore, to attain state
objectives, “relatively stable standards” are indispensable. 28 Thus,
“the activist state is driven to respect a degree of fixity in its law.” 29
Although not all activist states are authoritarian, an authoritarian state
is frequently activist; China, in particular, fits squarely into this
type. 30 Apart from the existent wisdom about the judicial system in
authoritarian states, I will highlight two other aspects in which the
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 165 (Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2011)
(discussing the embrace of modern forms of populist legality).
25
Pierre F. Landry, Does the Communist Party Help Strengthen China’s Legal
Reforms?, 9 CHINA REV. 45 (2009). At the micro level, empirical evidence also
ascertains the efficacy of formal laws in such areas as the labor market. See Fan
Cui et al.,, The Effects of the Labor Contract law on the Chinese Labor Market, 10
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 462 (2013).
26
Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg, Introduction: The Functions of Courts in
Authoritarian Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 4-11 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).
27
MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 82 (1986).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
For example, in China, many rules governing personal claims against tortious
actions are embedded in industrial regulatory schemes. In addition, certain “rights”
in China, such as the right to education under Art. 46 of the PRC Constitution,
shade into obligations, which is characteristic of an activist state. Id. at 84 & n.22.
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formal law can influence even those states that are not bound by the
rule of law.
First, the law in books can affect the settlement between
parties in a legal dispute, even in the absence of the rule of law. It is
common sense among law students that, in states under the rule of
law, parties frequently bargain outside the courtroom in the shadow
of the law. 31 Nevertheless, formal laws are nevertheless crucial to
such bargaining even when the parties know that the official rules
may not be strictly applied at trial. This is because of the “anchoring”
effect widely observed in human behaviors. This behavior refers to
a cognitive bias for a decision-maker to rely too heavily on the initial
piece of information offered when making a decision. 32
Formal legal rules set up the threat values indicating the
parties’ payoffs when the negotiation does not go through and the
parties end up in the courtroom. Hence, these values provide the
benchmark to which the parties will refer in the bargaining process.
In any event, a negotiated resolution to a dispute should not bring
lower payoffs to the parties than their threat values. 33 Where the
formal law is not faithfully followed, uncertainty may arise regarding
the parties’ threat values. 34 While the parties understand that the
outcome of a trial might be different from what a rigorous
implementation of the law will dictate, they will have difficulty in
adjusting their estimates to take into account the slackness in law
enforcement. The parties are likely to take the words of the formal
law as a starting point for their adjustments. Typically, such
adjustments are insufficient. As a result, the parties’ estimates of the
actual outcome of a trial tend to be biased toward what the strict

31

For a classic study on this topic, see Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
225 (1982) and Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
32
Anchoring was first systematically discussed in Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE
1124, 1124 (1974).
33
For the meaning and role of threat values in bargaining, see ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (6th ed.) 74-76 (2012).
34
Of course, parties can feel uncertain about their threat values even in jurisdictions
loyal to formal laws, usually due to the ambiguity or incompleteness of law. My
point here is simply that the greater variance of law enforcement will further
aggravate this uncertainty.
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enforcement of law would bring about. 35 In this sense, in countries
without strict adherence to the rule of law, the terms of out-of-court
settlements may as well be anchored to the mandate of these statutes.
This anchoring effect is especially important to lawmakers in
authoritarian states when they attempt to favor their patrons. When
the formal law sets threat values sufficiently low for groups
disfavored by lawmakers, the anchoring effect will likely discourage
these groups from making a demand in settlement bargaining high
enough to correct the bias embedded in the law. 36 Consequently,
terms of settlements that seemingly accommodate the disfavored
groups’ requests in excess of their entitlements under the law will
likely appease the disfavored groups without materially sacrificing
the interests of the favored groups. 37
Second, when the parties fail to settle and end up in trial, the
formal statutes will be applied as default rules. This is especially true
where the judiciary is structured as a hierarchal authority. As
Professor Damaška has observed, China is again a case in point. 38 If
a fault is found in the superior review of lower court decisions,
35

Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 31, at 1128.
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (6th ed.) 74-76 (2012).
37
A good case in this point is my own experience in bargaining for compensation
for the taking of our old residence in Shanghai. By setting a low initial assessment
of the property value and agreeing on compensation slightly higher than that
assessment, the government successfully induced the majority of the residents to
yield their property consensually. But the paid compensations were just a meager
portion of the tremendous surplus the local government and the developer would
derive from the taking. The initial assessment price was about 25,000 RMB per
square meter, and the old residential buildings in this area were usually two stories
high. Newly developed projects at the same location are sixteen to thirty-one
stories high and sold at an average price of 85,000 RMB per square meter. (For the
price
information,
see
http://luxiangyuan021.fang.com/house/1211081506/housedetail.htm). In other
words, the originally assessed compensation for a piece of a two-story property
with a premise of fifty square meters would be 2.5 million RMB, whereas new
development on this same premise can be sold at 68 to 131.75 million RMB.
Certainly, in most situations, the final amount of compensation was higher than the
original assessment. Based on our own case, the final compensation for a piece of
property on a premise of 50 square meters would be around 12 million RMB
including the potential premium from resale of the relocation property sold, at a
discount, to the owners subject to taking, i.e. 9% to 18% of the average market price
of the new development. It should be mentioned that we did a hard bargaining with
the government and were among the last 1% of residents to submit the property, so
the above estimation is by all means on the higher end.
38
Damaška, supra note 27, at 198-99.
36
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“hierarchical organizations have a battery of instruments at their
disposal to teach the errant official a lesson.” 39 In China, the judicial
disciplinary system for incorrectly decided cases (cuo’an zeren
zhuijiu zhidu) plays a major part in this regard, which can bring career
and financial sanctions to judges whose decisions have been reversed
or sent back for retrial in superior review. 40 Hence, in a hierarchal
judiciary, “official discretion is anathema[.]” 41 Instead, the so-called
“logical legalism,” characterized by a tight attachment to context-free
and general standards, is attractive to adjudicators under the
hierarchical authority. 42 Such negative attitudes toward discretion are
often heard among Chinese judges. 43 Thus, the explicit rules written
in statutes become the best authority on which to rely in adjudicating
commonplace cases. In this sense, the judicial arbitrariness stemming
from the absence of the rule of law is mitigated by judges’ reluctance
to exercise excessive discretion in a hierarchical system. This
reluctance, in turn, strengthens the formal statutes with more
authority rather than diminishing them in an authoritarian state. 44
However, judicial reservation over discretion in authoritarian
states should not be interpreted as volitional respect for the formal
rules of law. Instead, these rules are normally obeyed only in default
of other superseding factors. Such factors may include political
intervention or policy considerations, prominently from local
governments. It is mostly because of these superseding factors that
judges become willing to utilize various legal or extralegal devices to
make decisions detached from a literal application of the law in
books. 45 However, to take advantage of the superseding factors, it is
often necessary for the parties to credibly indicate their special
circumstances before the judges. More often than not, this implies
extra costs incurred by the parties in dispute, such as tapping into their
39

Id. at 49.
Carl Minzner, Judicial Disciplinary Systems for Incorrectly Decided Cases, in
CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, 58, 6473 (Margaret Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011).
41
Damaška, supra note 27, at 19-20.
42
Id. at 22-23.
43
Interview with Judge L, Shanghai, China (July 4, 2013); interview with Judge S,
Shanghai, China (July 28, 2014).
44
Previous studies on civil adjudications in China also found by-the-book decision
making a routine of the judiciary. See Stern, supra note 5, at 88.
45
For some examples of such devices, see id. at 89-91.
40
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political resources or daring extraordinary actions to claim their
relief. 46 In this sense, the formal statutes also help implement price
discrimination so that preferential treatment beyond what the law
permits will be awarded only to those who are capable of wielding
additional influence on adjudications. Through this discriminative
practice, judicial favoritism is delivered in a more targeted way to
better cater to the political priorities of the authoritarian regime.
More crucially, this practice saves costs for the legislatively favored
groups because, when encountering the disfavored groups, the
favored groups only have to pay the fair amount in dispute resolution
to the selected parties in the disfavored groups. These parties are
likely to be more politically powerful or go the extra mile to become
the squeaky wheel that gets the grease. As for the rest of the
underprivileged groups, however, by-the-book enforcement of law
will keep them in a disadvantaged position. Therefore, in view of the
possibility of discrimination, lawmakers are incentivized to design
formal rules that adversely affect the groups they disfavor, similar to
what a discriminative monopolist will do to the lower end of its
market, 47 so that the highest possible cost savings can be achieved for
their patrons. Hence, the law on the books again becomes a
battleground that cannot be easily conceded.
B.

Why Look at the Law of Torts?

First of all, tort law is vital to Chinese judicial practice. Tort
cases are among the most frequently litigated disputes in China. In
2008, for instance, the number of tort cases accepted by Chinese
courts totaled approximately 992,000. 48
While administrative
litigation has attracted substantial attention among students of the
Chinese legal system, 49 in the same year, the number of
46
For an example of such extraordinary actions used in anti-discrimination cases
in China, see Minzner, supra note 24, at 960; see also Xin He, Maintaining Stability
by Law: Protest-Supported Housing Demolition Litigation and Social Change in
China, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 849 (2014) (discussing protestors’ use of collective
administrative litigation to resist unfavorable housing demolition policies).
47
For a monopolist’s strategy to administer price discrimination, see HAL R.
VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICRO ECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH (7th ed.) 449450 (2006).
48
WANG, supra note 15, at 2.
49
Some important works in this line of research include Sean Cooney, Making
Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in the People’s
Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1050, 1050 (2007) (finding that while
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administrative cases going to Chinese courts was a mere 108,398 50-about one-tenth of the number of tort cases. While studying
administrative justice in China is unquestionably valuable, a
tremendous piece of our knowledge of the Chinese legal system
would be missing if the same scholastic diligence were not applied to
other areas of law, such as contracts and torts, which account for the
lion’s share of the courts’ everyday work.
In addition to its practical importance, tort law also brings
good theoretical justifications. Unlike contract law where contracting
parties can tailor most of the rules, tort law involves statutory
provisions that are mandatory. Therefore, the law in books takes a
more salient position in the area of torts. The rules guiding tort law
are less vulnerable to ex ante adjustments by the parties mainly
because of the high transaction costs of private agreements. For
example, in automobile accidents, it is plainly impossible for all
drivers and pedestrians to agree on the level of precaution that
everyone should employ while driving. 51 It is true that some types of
torts are at the crossroads of contracts and torts, such as medical
malpractice as reviewed below. Accordingly, parties might have a
chance to opt out of the tort system in advance. However, this chance
appears slim, at least in China. For one thing, in many of these
borderline situations, potential defendants have deeply affected the
creation of the tort rules. As result, it is hard to persuade such parties
to agree on contract terms different from the statutory rules of torts.
Chinese administrative law insufficiently combats labor abuses, emerging
regulatory innovation may eventually improve compliance with labor law); Ji Li,
Suing the Leviathan—An Empirical Analysis of the Changing Rate of
Administrative Litigation in China, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 815, 815 (2013)
(finding that “the rate of administrative litigation varies according to different
levels of lawyer density and urbanization”); Kevin J. O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Suing
the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China, 51 CHINA J. 75, 75
(2004) (concluding that the promulgation of the 1989 Administrative Litigation
Law resulted in only modest deterrent effects); Minxin Pei, Citizens v. Mandarins:
Administrative Litigation in China, 152 CHINA Q. 832, 832-833 (1997) (conducting
an empirical analysis of the implementation of the 1989 Administration Litigation
Law).
50
The Supreme People’s Court of China, 2008 Nian Quanguo Fayuan Shenli
Xingzheng Yishen Anjian Qingkuang (2008 年全国法院审理行政一审案件情况)
[National Statistics of the First-Instance Administrative Cases in 2008],
http://www.pkulaw.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=qikan&Gid=1510116816.
51
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 36, at 189.
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In addition, the contract law in China simply allows the victim to
choose between contractual and tort remedies in cases involving both
a breach of contract and a tortious action. 52 Coupled with the lack of
a defense of assumed risk, 53 victims lack the incentive to accept an ex
ante commitment to a level of care lower than the standard under tort
law in return for a lower price on the tortfeasor’s service. This is
because the victim can always renege and fall back to the tort law
standard. 54
Furthermore, a political and economic inquiry into the law of
torts is sensible because this body of law tends to represent collective
decisions and promote the collective goals of society. In contrast, the
law of contracts reflects predominantly individualistic decisions. The
law of torts is collectivistic to the extent that the payment and amount
of damages for harm caused by risky behaviors are determined on the
basis of state authority, rather than consensual purchases of the right
to harm. 55 In other words, under the tort system, the conditions and
costs for one party (the tortfeasor) to take away the legal entitlements
of another (the victim) are subject to the collective decision of society.
This stands in stark contrast to contracts, where people are permitted
to decide transaction terms on their own. Having established that the
tort law reveals collective decisions, it is appropriate to think of it as
an outcome of the political process, making it suitable for a political
economy analysis.
IV.

52

The Analytical Framework

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa (中国人民共和国合同法) [The PRC
Contract Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., March 15, 1999), art.
122.
53
With such a defense, the victim’s advance agreement on an insufficient level of
precaution by the tortfeasor may be considered an assumption of risk.
54
In theory, the victim can agree on a higher level of care by the tortfeasor and also
pay a higher price, in which case the victim will not have the incentive to renege.
Such an agreement is nonetheless infeasible because it is often impractical to spell
out the required level of precaution in the agreement and even more challenging to
verify it before the court. Verification is especially troublesome in cases requiring
specialized knowledge. In light of this difficulty, the tortfeasor will be incentivized
to behave opportunistically after pocketing the higher price.
55
Guido Calabresi, Torts – The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REV. 519,
528, 534 (1978). Torts also incorporate individualistic elements, as compared to
the criminal law that collectively determines which type of risky behaviors are
forbidden outright and sanctioned with severe penalties.
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The literature is legion on the political economy of legislation
in democracies. From this literature, I will borrow a basic analytical
framework and adapt it to the political and legal environment in
China.
A.

The Public Choice Theory on Legislation in
Democracies

In the last four decades since Stigler’s seminal work in 1971, 56
continuous efforts have been made to understand the official
rulemaking process in democracies, mostly informed by the public
choice theory. 57 His well-received insight that regulators are captured
by the regulated and adopt regulations mainly in the latter’s favor was
extended by Professor Peltzman to integrate different interest groups,
consumers and producers into the rent-seeking struggle through
regulation. 58 In a similar spirit, the late Nobel laureate Gary Becker
developed a generalized model to encompass the various
determinants of political equilibrium out of interest group contests for
influence. 59 In a slightly different context, when examining the
evolution of law, Professor Rubin hypothesized that the statutory law,
just like the common law, tended to approach efficiency only if the
law would affect two well-defined small interest groups competing
for advantageous treatment. 60
56

George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 3 (1971).
57
There was an even longer history of the public interest theory on regulations
before the public choice theory dominated the area. This earlier theory argued that
the principal government interventions in the economy were responses to public
demands for the correction of “palpable and remedial inefficiencies and inequalities
in the operation of the free market.” The public interest theory, however, is now
considered theoretically unsound and empirically unsupported. See Richard A.
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 336341, 350 (1974).
58
Sam Peltzman, Towards a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON.
211, 211 (1976).
59
Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371 (1983).
60
Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 61
(1977) (positing that although statutes are often inefficient, lobbying for statutes
can sometimes be a substitute for litigation); Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and
Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 211-19 (1982) (finding support for the claim
that “[p]recedents will also be efficient if parties . . . are symmetrically
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While the above literature uncovered the presence of interest
groups in molding legislative preferences, another line of public
choice research, known as the positive political theory (“PPT”),
endeavors to relate the products of lawmaking to the specific
institutional structures of lawmaking. Inspired by Hotelling’s famous
location model, 61 the classic works by the political economists
Black 62 and Downs 63 broached the tradition to dissect elections in
representative democracies using spatial models. More recently,
spatial models have been extended further to explain the legislative
behaviors in a wider ambit encompassing the strategic interactions
among different branches of government. 64 PPT recognizes that all
political actors have a specified policy preference, and “[T]he core
assumption . . . is that all relevant actors . . . act rationally to bring
policy as close as possible to their own preferred outcome.” 65 To PPT
scholars, the judiciary is no longer considered as having the final say
on statutory interpretations, and the legislature, constrained by its
internal structure, acts in response to executive choices as well as
judicial decisions. 66
The public choice theory of legislation has vastly enriched our
knowledge about the impetus behind lawmaking. A number of law
distributed . . . but the efficiency is a by-product of the litigation process aimed at
maximizing the wealth of the litigants”). See also GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON
TRIAL: THE PURE THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE (1980).
61
Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 41 (1929).
62
Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON.
23, 23 (1948).
63
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
64
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND
INSTITUTIONS 123-41 (2nd ed.) (2010).
65
McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and
the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (1995).
66
See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory
Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 263 (1992) (arguing that the
legislature reacts to judicial interpretations of statutes and that “interpretation is
inevitably political”; John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, Limitation of Statutes:
Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565, 566 (1992) (arguing that courts
are an ameliorative force in correcting the incentive structure of the legislature);
McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 705-706 (1992) (outlining a framework that courts
should use when interpreting legislation); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R.
Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 1207 (2007) (using the positive political theory to explore to what extent
statutory expansion affects legislative policymaking). See also ROBERT D. COOTER,
THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 213-39 (2000); SHEPSLE, supra note 64 at 123-41.
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scholars have utilized the theory to shed new light on the creation of
certain specific laws. Some of this research is focused on pinpointing
the interests of the different groups involved in the formation of law, 67
while others relied on spatial models to explain lawmaking under a
particular set of institutional conditions. 68 Enlightened by these
thoughtful works on legislation, I now turn to Chinese tort law from
a political economy perspective.
B.

A Variant of the Public Choice Theory in China: Two
Determinants
1.

Why a Variant?

As reviewed above, the public choice theory on lawmaking
starts from identifying the interest groups affected by the law at issue
and rests the analysis on the capacity of these groups to claim their
territories within the given institutional structure. The key insight of
this academic tradition is that, instead of being motivated by the
public interest, statutes and regulations cater to the requests of groups

67
E.g. Macey & Miller, supra note 10; Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy
of Product Liability Reform, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 311, 311 (1988) (discussing the
push by lawyers on the plaintiff and defendant side to bar reform to product liability
laws); Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of
International Sales Law, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 446 (2005) (arguing that
reforms to international sales laws “. . . predictably failed to supply contracting
parties with the default terms they prefer, thus violating the normative criterion that
justifies the law-making process in the first instance”).; Peter V. Letsou, The
Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY L.J. 587, 667 (1995)
(contending that “ . . . the regulation of coercive collection powers of consumer
lenders can be best understood as a contest among interest groups that is mediated
by politicians with interests that go beyond obtaining the highest price for
regulation”); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA.
L. REV. 111 (1987) (examining the need for takeover statutes and analyzing the
politics involved in enacting a takeover statute in Connecticut). See also MARK J.
ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003).
68
E.g. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 11; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL.,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 109-15 (2nd ed.) (2006); Daniel B.
Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative
History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Interpretation, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1418 (2003).
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that can effectively deliver what the lawmakers need – be it votes,
money, or information. 69
Whereas the influence of interest groups is still crucial to the
analysis of lawmaking under China’s authoritarian regime, such
influence alone cannot fully account for the substance of the law. In
democracies, where a typical voter remains “rationally ignorant”
about public affairs, legislators can count on the interest groups to
supply the essentials for political survival, votes in particular. 70 In
this sense, rent-seeking is a tolerated element of politics in democratic
states, at least when it stays within the boundaries of existing law.
However, things are quite different in authoritarian states like China.
First, under the strict state control over civil association,
China has a dearth of social groups spontaneously organized by its
citizens. As well-known to the students of modern China, each selfidentified group in Chinese society “is allowed to be “represented”
by only one body, and that body must reach an appropriate
accommodation with the governing authorities”. 71 In other words, the
opportunity to form an interest group is reserved only for segments
with governmental endorsement. At the same time, state-sanctioned
groups are often awarded monopolistic positions to extract rents in
return for their support of the regime. Therefore, in China, as in many
other authoritarian states, there is no level playing field for rentseeking, and rents are systematically transferred from the general

69

This is not to deny that legislation can sometimes be consistent with the public
interest or the general efficiency requirement, especially when groups with
opposing interests are competing for legislative favor. See Becker, supra note 59;
Rubin, supra note 60, at 216 (stating that in 19th century England, polluters, who
were the party with the ongoing interest, would prevail in court over the public
interest). The point is that the public interest is not the primary concern in
rulemaking.
70
People choose not to get informed because the cost of doing so exceeds its benefit.
MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES, 25-26 (1982); see also Becker, supra note
59, at 391-94. There are, of course, situations where the typical voter snaps to
attention. Then, in order to win the reelection, the legislators can no longer afford
to neglect the preferences of the diffuse public. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC
OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1992). The value of the public choice theory resides,
however, in the guidance it offers us to understand the habitual undersupply of laws
championing the public interest at the expense of well-organized pressure groups.
71
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH
REFORM 300 (2d ed. 2004).
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public to the coalition that effectively governs the country. 72 Hence,
rent-seeking by interest groups becomes a compromising factor for
the legitimacy of the regime, which poses a serious threat to its
security.
Second, authoritarian leaders cannot rely on the interest
groups to obtain accurate information necessary for their political
survival. The groups handpicked by the regime to extract rents are
unlikely to reveal any intelligence working against the groups’ own
interests. Without effective counteracting forces to induce disclosure,
authoritarian leaders are deprived of the chance to correctly evaluate
the consequences of their policies and swiftly deal with potential
challenges to their endurance. It is just a reflection of the “dictator’s
dilemma” predicating that the more effective a dictator is at
repression, the less likely he may be able to use repression to remain
in office. 73 This is because repression obfuscates the information
needed to target repression accurately.
Considering the characteristics of the authoritarianism in
China, I postulate a variant to the public choice theory to analyze the
Chinese law of torts. In addition to the influence of interest groups,
this variant takes populist pressure as the other determinant of the
substance of the law. Generally speaking, these two determinants are
working in opposite directions. While the interest groups exert
influence to shape the law to their benefit, populist pressure moves
the law to be more hospitable to their counterparties in tort disputes.
Before assessing the effects of the two determinants, however,
I should clarify that by no means do I attempt to claim that these are
the variables sufficient to account for the entire body of tort law in
China. Other factors, such as the accepted practices in civil law
jurisdictions, also contributed to the design of Chinese tort law. The
goal of my current project is more modest: it merely tries to tease out
the components in the tort law indicating an underlying logic of
political economy that have so far been missed by most China law
scholars.
72

Stephen Haber, Authoritarian Government, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 693-702 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman, eds.,
2006).
73
The term comes from RONALD WINTROBE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DICTATORSHIP 335 (1998), but the idea goes back to GORDON TULLOCK,
AUTOCRACY 115–127 (1987) (discussing the possibility that a dictator can be
removed from power).
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2.

Political Influence

In China, government ministries are heavily involved in the
operation of a wide array of industries ranging from railways and
electricity to medicine. 74 These industrial groups are well-organized
and derive highly concentrated benefits from rent-seeking. On the
contrary, the grass-root groups in China rarely survive legitimately, 75
and even if they are allowed to exist under the restrictive regulatory
framework, it is hardly possible for them to challenge the interest
groups tied to the government. In effect, the Chinese legal system
deliberately inflated the organization costs of the groups without
governmental blessing so that they are paralyzed from producing
collective goods for their members. Considering the intimacy
between the interest groups and the regime, the first determinant
pertaining to the political economy of Chinese tort law examined in
this paper is political influence.
In the realm of torts, interest groups with official endorsement
tend to be in the position of tortfeasors and are organized, whereas
victims are usually unorganized. This is especially true with respect
to special torts, such as railway accidents or medical malpractice.
The lack of organization of victim groups is partly attributable to
impediments traditionally associated with organizing large latent
groups, as identified by Olson. 76 However, the Chinese government’s
tight control over spontaneous social groups certainly intensified the

74

Although the economic reform has corporatized the operation entities in some of
these industries into large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) directly held by the
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC),
substantive management rights in such SOEs are granted to the ministries with
supervisory authority over the relevant industries. Li-wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt,
We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State
Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 726 (2013).
75
Under the current Chinese administrative regulation, voluntarily organized social
groups can acquire legitimate status only after approval by and registration with
government agencies. Shehui Tuanti Dengji Guanli Tiaoli (社会团体登记管理条
例 ) [Regulation on Registration and Administration of Social Organizations]
(promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 25, 1998, effective Feb. 6, 2016), art. 3
(hereinafter “Regulation on Social Organizations”). In addition, within each
administrative region, only one social organization is allowed to represent a
particular sector of society. Id. at 13(2).
76
OLSON, supra note 70.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss2/1

2016]

UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TORTS IN CHINA 193

difficulty. 77 Indeed, an attempt to organize salient victim groups can
even bring about substantial risk of persecution. 78
In passing, it is worth noting that, although the interest groups
are more politically entrenched than the unorganized victims, their
political influences are uneven nevertheless. Part IV will make a
rough assessment of the influences of a few of these groups.
3.

Populist Pressure

If we assume the political influence of interest groups solely
determine the formation of the Chinese tort law, given the absence of
organized victims, we would anticipate the predominance of onesided rules favoring tortfeasors in the law. In particular, we would
not see rule changes tipping the balance toward victims without the
emergence of potent tort victim groups. As a matter of fact, we did
see these changes. Therefore, another factor must exist to moderate
the effect of political influence. This counteracting factor is populist
pressure, which has been thought of as a critical feature of the
Chinese judicial system in last decade. Some Chinese legal scholars
believe that populist pressure represented a change in policy, 79
whereas others trace it back to China’s revolutionary legal practices. 80
77

Apart from the aforementioned general restrictions on voluntary associations, the
regime is no more tolerant toward plaintiffs of group litigations. For instance, the
Chinese civil justice system adopts the less plaintiff-friendly opt-in rule in
collective actions. More importantly, courts, whose incentives are molded by the
government agendas, dominate the process of collective actions. Moreover,
Chinese lawyers are subject to strict official surveillance when handling “mass suits”
(quntixing anjian), and the contingency fee arrangements are no longer available to
fund collective actions. Michael Palmer & Chao Xi, Collective and Representative
Actions
in
China,
https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/event/261321/media/slspublic/Chi
na_National_Report.pdf.
78
The best-known case in this regard is the arrest and conviction of Zhao Lianhai,
the father of a victim in the melamine-tainted milk scandal who became a leader in
the parents’ movement to seek legal remedies and medical treatments for their
children. See Shiyu Wang, et al., Jieshi Baobao: Haishi Yige “Jie” (结石宝宝：
还 是 一 个 “ 结 ”) [Stone Babies: Remaining a Complex], June 19, 2013,
http://www.nandu.com/nis/201306/19/67650.html (describing the story of Zhao
Lianhai and the travails he faced).
79
Minzner, supra note 24, at 936.
80
Liebman, supra note 24, at 166.
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Evidently, populist pressure has loomed large in national politics
since Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took office in 2003 and prioritized
“stability maintenance” (weiwen) on the Chinese Communist Party’s
(CCP’s) agenda. 81
At the bottom of the regime’s emphasis on populist opinion
might be a sophisticated strategy to retain political dominance of the
CCP. This strategy is closely associated with the fundamental
difficulty faced by authoritarian leaders to gather correct information
from citizens under their rule. As noted by an eminent China scholar,
unlike the democracies where the median voter’s opinion tends to
prevail, the authoritarian government in China cares more about “the
vocal extremists who are the most likely to take to the streets.” 82 Due
to a lack of competitive elections, an uncensored news media, and an
active civil society, authoritarian regimes have to rely more
frequently on citizens’ radical behaviors, such as protests, to detect
and deal with the discontented communities before they turn to
counter-regime activities. 83 In this sense, extreme actions help the
regime screen the genuine grievances that risk a revolt. By appeasing
only those truly dissatisfied parts of the society, the government can
avoid indiscriminately buying off every section of the society, hence
reducing the cost to maintain its rule. 84 A selective response to public
opinions targeted at the intense discontents will also effectively
showcase the regime’s concern about its citizens and improve its
legitimacy.
It would be a mistake, however, to think of authoritarian
governments as always responsive to populist demand. On the one
hand, the strategy is adopted, after all, to preserve the regime. As
such, populist schemes aiming at toppling the government will not be
81

See KEVIN J. O’BRIEN & LIANJIANG LI, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE IN RURAL CHINA
(2006); Steve Tsang, Consultative Leninism: China’s New Political Framework,
18 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 865, 866 (2009) (defining five characteristics of
consultative Leninism, the political system in China following the fall of
Communism); Bruce J. Dickson, Populist Authoritarianism: The Future of the
Chinese Communist Party, Presentation at the Conference on “Chinese Leadership,
Politics,
and
Policy”
2
(Nov.
2,
2005),
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Dickson.pdf (arguing that Chinese leaders face
chronic, rather than acute, problems and that public opinion is “surprisingly
complacent”).
82
SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE POWER 44 (2007).
83
Peter L. Lorentzen, Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in and
Authoritarian Regime, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 127, 129 (2013).
84
Id. at 133-36.
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tolerated. Consequently, populist pressure is likely to affect
government policies only when its rhetoric is framed as accepting the
regime’s legitimacy and narrowed to some particular economic issues
or certain lower levels of the government. 85 On the other hand, an
overly lenient response to popular demands will encourage
communities without real grievances to take advantage of the
government’s accommodating policies by stirring up false populist
pressure. In other words, excessive tolerance reduces extreme
populist actions to cheap talk and compromises the credibility of
populist pressure as a signal of social discontent. 86 To disincentivize
fake populist actions, authoritarian regimes take measures to elevate
the costs of those actions. One example of such costs is the
aforementioned requirement for careful rhetoric framing to
distinguish a loyalist demand from a counter-regime uprising. In
addition, in the case of China, the government seems to use incentives
and punishments discriminatorily, even to the participants of the
same mass incident. For example, while the vast majority of the
participants of the riots in Shishou and Weng’an escaped without
consequences, those believed to be critical instigators were jailed in
the aftermath. 87 Uncertainty about penalties faced by activists in mass
incidents further raises the costs of populist actions.
In relation to torts, populist pressure is usually vented against
some particular government agencies or the industries under their
supervision. These are often tortfeasors in some special categories of
accidents. Therefore, the strength of such pressure may well be
correlated with the intensity and frequency of the accidents. While
the legal system is ill-equipped to confront the full range and quantity
of tort claims resulting from China’s rapid social transformation and
proliferation of new laws, populist activities in certain areas such as
medical malpractice may serve as credible evidence of grievances
meriting serious attention. 88 At the same time, in the field of torts,
since popular grievances are normally targeted at specific agencies
and about specific rules of liability without broader implications on
85

Id. at 143-44.
Id. at 135.
87
Peter L. Lorentzen & Suzanne Scoggins, Rising Rights Consciousness:
Undermining or Undergirding China’s Stability? 13 (Sept. 1, 2011), (unpublished
manuscript presented at the 2011 American Political Science Association Annual
Meeting) (on file with the author).
88
Liebman, supra note 3, at 254.
86
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the regime’s power to rule, chances are higher that the government
will take a flexible position to cope with the popular requests.
C.

A Spatial Model
1.

Setup

The spatial model presented in this section is heuristic, mainly
to illustrate a decision-making mechanism through which the above
two factors will influence the legislative outcomes. Rulemaking
about torts can be depicted on a one-dimensional policy space of provictim or pro-tortfeasor choices. While political influence pushes
laws toward the pro-tortfeasor end, populist pressure affects the law
in the opposite direction.
Four players will jointly decide the location of the adopted
rules in this space: the government agency (G), the SPC (C), the top
CCP leaders (L), and the assembly making a policy choice (A). They
have the usual single-peaked preferences in the policy space. This
means the utility functions depicting their preferences over the policy
alternatives under consideration have a maximum at some point on a
line representing these alternatives and slopes away from this
maximum on either side. 89 Their preferences are functions of political
influence and populist pressure. G takes charge of drafting the special
statutes on tort liability. As noted above, the government agency
often represents the interests of particular industries that tend to be
tortfeasors of special torts; therefore, it prefers a pro-tortfeasor rule. 90
The SPC is responsible for issuing judicial interpretations and is
assumed to share the preferences of courts and judges. Since judges
are at the forefront of handling tort litigation, they are probably the
most vulnerable to populist pressure. From time to time, the judge
presiding over a case is blamed as the culprit of an unpopular decision
and risks his or her career or even personal safety. 91 On the other
89

SHEPSLE, supra note 64, at 92.
This is not to deny the conflict of interests among different ministries generally
present in the drafting of laws and regulations inside the State Council, see TANNER,
supra note 4, at 127-29, 217-30 (describing the relationships between key
lawmaking institutions). Nonetheless, in the context of tort liabilities, victims’
interests are unlikely to be bolstered by the ministries for lack of organization of
the victim group.
91
A good illustration in this regard is the well-known Peiyu case in Nanjing. Liang
Guorui, Wangchuan: “Pengyu An” Huo Fanan? Heshi: Zhushen Faguan Wei
90

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss2/1

2016]

UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TORTS IN CHINA 197

hand, judges usually do not reap sizable benefit from ardently
upholding the interests of industrial tortfeasors. Consequently,
relative to other players of the game, C is presumed to take a provictim position.
The top leaders and decision-making assembly are deemed as
two separate players to account for the collective decision-making
mechanism inside the CCP, as pointed out in the recent literature on
Chinese politics, without downplaying the role of the top leaders in
steering policies in a calculated direction. 92 The top leaders are the
few people at the pinnacle of China’s power pagoda who are able to
set up the policy agenda for the country. The general secretary of the
CCP and the Premier of the State Council are among the top leaders.
The decision-making assembly is the top twenty-five to thirty-five
people inside the power structure, normally including the members
of the CCP Politburo. 93 These people make up the locus of the
collective decision-making. Considering their multifaceted policy
objectives, L and A are postulated to have preferences in between G
and C, but preferences may also differ between L and A. In particular,
I will introduce two assumptions about L’s and A’s preferences. First,
it is assumed that L’s preference is closer to G’s preference, as
compared to A’s, when the level of populist pressure is low. This
assumption takes into account the more diverse composition of A, so
its members’ preferences tend to be more heterogeneous than L. 94
Since the head of the State Council, of which G is a part, is included
in L, it is plausible that L will better entertain G’s concerns than A.
The second assumption is that L is more sensitive than A to populist
pressure.
This is a reasonable assumption if the ultimate
Tingzhi Jiancha (网 传： “彭 宇 案 ”或 翻 案 ？ 核 实：主 审法 官 未 停 职 检 查 )
[Rumors on the Internet: The “Pengyu Case” May Be Reversed? Verified Facts:
The Judge in Charge Is Not Suspended and Inspected] Guangzhou Daily (Oct. 25,
2011), http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/html/2011-10/25/content_1509812.htm.
92
The core leader is believed to have less power over his colleagues after Deng’s
era, so the internal decision-making process of CCP increasingly takes on a
collective flavor. At the same time, he still holds the institutional power to convene
and to preside the meetings of the decision-making group. Lieberthal, supra note
71, at 175, 211.
93
Id. at 207-15.
94
The elite decision-making group is considered to be less cohesive during the
reform era and differentiated by functional area of work and degree of
specialization. Id. at 211 -15.
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accountability for policy choices is more likely to rest on the top
leaders than the decision-making assembly.
A status quo exists before the players take actions, and it is
thought to be the provisions of the General Principles. Naturally, the
oldest rules on torts can be regarded as the status quo. Furthermore,
as detailed in the next Part, benchmarking the subsequent changes in
rules against the General Principles also facilitates ascertaining the
effects of political influence and populist pressure behind these
changes.
I consider two different periods of time. The first period
contains up to two rounds of lawmaking, while the second period only
has one round. The players have fixed preferences at each period, but
only L’s and A’s preferences can change between the two periods.
For simplicity, I assume that the game is played independently at
these two periods. 95
At the first period, L will decide whether to begin a
lawmaking process to replace the status quo. 96 When the process is
started, G will make a proposal, after which A will decide whether to
take G’s proposal. If A rejects the proposal, the game at the first
period will end and the status quo remains unchanged. On the other
hand, if A accepts G’s proposal, it becomes a new law. But
immediately after that, L can decide again whether to start another
round of lawmaking. If the process opens a second time at the first
period, C and G can put forward competitive proposals for A to
choose from, and the one who wins the competition will be the law
at the end of the first period. Of course, if the process is not reopened,
then G’s original proposal remains the law when this period ends.
The rules of the first-period game take into account an important
restriction on C’s action, i.e. C can make a proposal only after G’s
proposal has been adopted during the first round of lawmaking. This
95

This assumption is innocuous for our purposes. As shown below, the preference
changes, as well as the resulting rule changes, often take a long time in China. The
two legislative periods usually span over ten years. The assumption hence makes
sense insofar as the players’ discount factors are not unreasonably high.
96
This, however, does not mean that L will always be the original source of
legislative proposals. Consistent with Tanner’s finding, in my model, the top
leadership does not have to commence the drafting of any proposal. TANNER, supra
note 4, at 212-13. Instead, L’s key role is to decide whether a proposal initiated by
other players will be placed on the official agenda of lawmaking, again in
consonance with Tanner’s proposition that the top leadership endorsement is a
pivotal stage in China’s lawmaking process. TANNER, supra note 4, at 209.
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is a reflection of the fact, as indicated in the legislative history of the
Chinese tort law, that a judicial interpretation regarding a special type
of torts can only interpret an existing law but not stand on its own.
At the second period, given a change of status quo in the
previous period, 97 and in case of a shift of preferences, L will decide
whether to commence yet another lawmaking process. If L chooses
to do so, both G and C can make proposals and the one adopted by A
becomes the law at the end of this second period. Similar to the
second round of the first-period lawmaking, G and C compete with
each other to make proposals at the second period. This is possible
because once there is a law pertaining to a certain category of torts,
C will be able to propose judicial interpretations on that law, whereas
G can also propose amendments to the original law.
It is important to note that, despite the SPC and the State
Council’s de jure authority to enact judicial interpretations and
administrative regulations, respectively, the overarching power of the
Party enables its leadership to retain de facto control over the
rulemaking. 98 This is captured by L’s agenda-setting power and A’s
approval power in the setup.
2.

Some Possible Outcomes

Since the purpose of this paper is to explain Chinese tort law
in light of political motivations, I will present three consequences
attainable in such a lawmaking game instead of offering a complete
solution. As we will see in the next Part, these consequences appear
to be largely consistent with the actual state of the tort law in China.
In Figure 1, the lower case sq, c, a, l, and g indicate the status
quo and the four players’ ideal positions, respectively. The Figure
represents a scenario where the status quo is more sympathetic to the
victims than any of the four players’ preferences. The distances
between their ideals satisfy the following conditions: 1) g-l < l-sq; 2)
g-l < l-a; and 3) g-a < a-sq. In this case, there is no change of

97
If the status quo did not change, then the second-period game would be played
as a first-period game.
98
See TANNER, supra note 4, at 64-66 (explaining that although the role of Party
leadership with respect to lawmaking has become less assertive—especially during
the late 1980s—it probably still has power to influence the drafting process through
vetoing and giving “prior approval” of laws before enactment).
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preferences due to populist pressure between the first and second
periods.
Figure 1 Adoption of Special Statutes and Judicial Interpretations Without
Preference Changes

Pro-victim

sq

c

a
l
g
Period 1 & Period 2

Pro-tortfeasor

In the situation plotted by Figure 1, using backwards
induction, L can predict that when it opens a second round of
lawmaking, G and C will compete to make proposals while A will
choose whichever proposal is closer to its ideal point (a), hence
leading eventually to a law located at that point. 99 Therefore, L will
start a second round only if the result of the first round of lawmaking
is farther away from l than a is. On the other hand, in the first round,
A will approve any proposal made by G located closer to a than sq.
With the knowledge of the other players’ choices, G will propose, in
the first round, a law located exactly at its own ideal position g since
given condition 3, A will approve this proposal. Finally, foreseeing
that g will be proposed and approved in the first round, L will be
ready to initiate the whole lawmaking process in light of condition 1.
Under condition 2, however, once g is approved, L will not open the
second round. Therefore, g, the most pro-tortfeasor legislation, will
appear at the end of the first period. Now that neither L nor A changes
its preference, g will remain the law at the second period.
In the second case scenario, the players have the same
preferences at Period 1 as depicted in Figure 1, but L’s ideal position,
l’, shifts to the left at Period 2 so that condition 2 above becomes g1’ > l’-a. 100 Figure 2 shows the second period of this case scenario.

99

This is the outcome of a typical Hotelling-Downs location model, see Hotelling,
supra note 61; see also DOWNS, supra note 63 at 122 (applying Hotelling’s spatial
market to argue that a “stable equilibrium” is possible for multiparty systems).
100
A’s ideal position a is assumed to remain unchanged for simplicity. However,
this assumption is not essential to the revised condition 2). If we denote A’s ideal
position at Period 2 as a’, the generalized form of the revised condition 2) can be
written as g-l’ > l’-a’. Given that L is more sensitive to populist pressure than A,
we will have l’-a’ < l-a. Hence, the revised condition 2) can be satisfied insofar as
L’s preference changes sufficiently so that g-l’ ≥ l-a.
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Figure 2

Pro-victim

Adoption of Special Statutes and Judicial Interpretations With
Preference Changes: Less Pro-victim Than Status Quo

sq

c

a
Period 2

l’

g

Pro-tortfeasor

As shown above, the first period of lawmaking will yield
legislation located at g. Now, expecting the outcome to be a, L will
initiate the lawmaking process at Period 2 since, compared to the
Period 1 outcome (g), this process will bring the law closer to L’s
new ideal position l’ under the revised condition 2. Consequently,
after L’s preference changes, the law becomes more favorable to
victims, though still less so than the status quo.
Figure 3 illustrates the third situation with Panel (A)
indicating the players’ preferences at the first period and Panel (B) at
the second. Here, at the first period, C’s ideal point, c, is to the left
of the status quo, meaning the latter is no longer the most pro-victim
stance. In addition, unlike in the previous two cases, both A’s and
L’s ideal positions are farther away from G’s preferred point, g, than
from the status quo. In other words, in Panel (A), the following
conditions are met: 4) 0 < sq-c; 5) 0 < a-sq; 6) l-sq < g-l; 7) a-sq <
g-a.
Figure 3 Adoption of Special Statutes and Judicial Interpretations With Preference
Changes: More Pro-victim Than Status Quo
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Period 1
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Pro-tortfeasor
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(B)

Pro-victim c
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Knowing that, at the first period, the second-round lawmaking
will result in a law located at a, backward induction will show that L
will open that round only if a is closer to l than the outcome of the
first round. Since A will approve any proposal no farther away from
a than sq in the first round, G will propose g* so that g*-a = a-sq if
𝑎𝑎−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑎𝑎−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
l > 2 + 𝑎𝑎, or g*-l = l-a if l ≤ 2 + 𝑎𝑎. 101 Given condition 5 and
the assumption that l is to the right of a, it must be true that g*-l < lsq, 102 so L will initiate the very first round of lawmaking at Period 1.
But at the same time, once g* is picked, a can never be closer to l than
g*, hence excluding the possibility of a second round of lawmaking.
In short, g* will be the law adopted at the end of Period 1.
At the second period illustrated in Panel (B), both L and A
have changed preferences due to populist pressure. In particular, their
new ideal points, l’ and a’, satisfy the conditions 11) 0 < sq-l’; 12) 0
< sq-a’, i.e. both a’ and l’ situated to the left of sq; and 13) l’-a’ <
g*-l’. Consequently, L is willing to initiate a lawmaking process at
Period 2, which will lead to a law situated at a’, closer to L’s new
ideal than g*. Again, we see a new law more favorable to the victims
after the shift of preferences. Moreover, as both L and A changed
preferences substantially, the new law leans even more toward the
victims than the status quo.
3.

Discussion

In the above spatial model, strong political influence drags
L’s and A’s ideal positions nearer to G’s peak of preference, whereas
strong populist pressure works in the opposite way. Accordingly, the
first case scenario depicts an interest group that is politically
influential and subject to mild populist pressure. L and A cluster their
preferences around G’s liking at both periods. On the other hand, the
second case can be associated with an interest group having strong
political influence but also facing strong populist pressure, which
leads L to make a moderate preference change at the second period.
See infra note 102 (explaining that g* must satisfy three conditions: 8) g*-a ≤
a-sq; 9) g*-1 ≤ l-a; and 10) g*-1 ≤ l-sq. 9) can be rewritten as g*-a ≤ 2(l-a). Thus,
𝑎𝑎−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
+ 𝑎𝑎, 8) is binding; otherwise, 9) is binding. As for
when a-sq < 2(l-a), i.e. l >
2
10), it is always satisfied in this case).
102
Id. (stating that l is to the right of a implies a-sq < l-sq and g*-l < g*-a. Since
𝑎𝑎−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
g*-a = a-sq if l >
+ 𝑎𝑎, we will have g*-l < a-sq < l-sq. On the other hand, if
101

l≤

𝑎𝑎−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
2

2

+ 𝑎𝑎, from condition 5), it follows g*-1 = l-a < l-sq).
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Finally, the third case scenario illustrates a moderately influential
interest group confronted with strong populist pressure. Thus, L and
A shift their preferences considerably away from G’s.
The model suggests a first-mover advantage on G’s side.
Since a law must be adopted before C can interpret it, G enjoys
substantial freedom in shaping the initial law. 103 By contrast, when
C’s turn comes to make proposals for judicial interpretations, G will
contest C by proposing amendments to the original law. Such
competition restricts C’s capacity to get its ideal policy. G’s firstmover advantage not only corresponds to the actual temporal order
of rulemaking in China, but also accords with China’s political reality
featuring a powerful executive branch and a weak judiciary. 104 Of
course, G’s advantage grows larger as L’s and A’s preferences
diverge farther away from the status quo relative to the distance
between their preferences and G’s. This means that within the
executive branch, ministries with more political clout can fix a law to
favor their positions compared to their less influential counterparts.
Another implication of the model is the CCP leadership’s
capacity to use the judiciary to balance out the influence held by the
103
It is worth noting that, in practice, the government agencies’ advantage over the
judiciary comes from a wide variety of sources other than the early movement in
lawmaking. In fact, the first-mover status is used to model G’s favorable position
in the political system generally.
104
For a classic study on the weakness of Chinese courts during the reform era, see
generally Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty
Years, 20 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 383, 383 (2000) (explaining that while the two
decades of law reform since 1979 empowered legal institutions and legislation,
courts still faced difficulties and obstacles as result of Maoist legacy, such as
disorderly allocation of legislative power and continuing political interference).
For administrative interferences over judicial enforcement of civil judgments, see
Clarke, supra note 23, at 41-52 (explaining how “the dependence of local court
personnel upon local government at the same level for their jobs and finances”
empower local protectionism to thwart courts from executing judgments contrary
to “state administrative organs and local power holders”). This is not to deny,
though, that Chinese courts may be gaining more power over the years. See, e.g.,
Xin He, The Judiciary Pushes Back: Law, Power, and Politics in Chinese Courts,
in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW
PROMOTION 180 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010) (purporting that the judicial
branch remains far less prestigious than the executive branch in China’s power
structure. The head of the latter is always a member of the most powerful Standing
Committee of the CCP Politburo, whereas few Chief Justices fared better than a
much lower-profile member of the CCP Central Committee when in office).
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executive branch. To the extent that the judiciary is more amenable
to the leadership’s control, promoting its competition with the
executive reigns in the conflicts between the latter and the Party
leadership. In effect, then, competition between the judiciary and
executive is indeed a wrestling between the Party leadership as the
principal and the executive branch as the agent. Therefore, the
leaders at the apex have a slightly larger decision-making circle and
take center stage in my construction of the interaction among the
political players. This postulation seems congruent with the
authoritarian characteristics of the Chinese regime. Despite the
tendency of decentralization inside this system, the CCP has
maintained the ability to set the tone for the country’s key policies. 105
4.

Extension to General Statutes

The model discussed in this section can be adapted to
illustrate the legislation of the Tort Liability Law. The entity in
charge of this legislation, the NPC Standing Committee (N), is at a
similar position to the government agencies in that it also enjoys a
first-mover advantage relative to the judiciary, as judicial
interpretations come only after the statute. Moreover, compared to
the judiciary, it is more able to defy the Party leadership, although
less so than the executive branch, mainly due to its higher institutional
standing. 106 A few adjustments to the model are nevertheless needed.
First of all, N, though still subject to interest group influences, is not
necessarily more pro-tortfeasor than L or A. This is because, unlike
G, N does not run or derive benefits from the injurious industries
where the special interests crystalize. Besides, as noted in Part I, the
drafting process of general statutes is more transparent and
responsive to the public, which curbs N’s impulse to be excessively
105

See PIERRE F. LANDRY, DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA: THE
COMMUNIST PARTY’S CONTROL OF LOCAL ELITES IN THE POST-MAO ERA (2008)
(positing that despite decentralization, CCP has maintained its influence on national
policy); see also Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Did Government
Decentralization Cause China’s Economic Miracle? 58 WORLD POL. 505, 506
(2006) (arguing it was China’s” authoritarian centralization”—before
decentralization—that stimulated and laid the foundation for reform policies? the
critical role of the top leadership in kicking off the reform policies).
106
See TANNER, supra note 4, at 72, 92 (supporting the claim that the head of the
NPC Standing Committee is usually a member of the Standing Committee of the
CCP Politburo, while the members of the NPC Standing Committee are generally
on the nomenklatura list of the Politburo).
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pro-tortfeasor. 107 Second, L, as compared to A, does not have to stay
closer to N in the policy space even before the populist pressure soars.
This reflects N’s lesser significance to the survival of the
authoritarian regime, causing top leaders to pay less attention to N’s
preferences than to G’s. Third, when analyzing the legislative game
of the Tort Liability Law, the status quo should be the relevant rules
in the special statutes or judicial interpretations existing right before
the adoption of this general statute. 108 Finally, since the Tort Liability
Law was promulgated very recently, changes in players’ preferences
have yet to happen. Thus, there is no need to consider the second
period lawmaking occurring as a result of preference change only.
This adjusted spatial model will be used to explain some
specific provisions of the Tort Liability Law in the next Part. Suffice
it here to mention two predictions of the model. First, when the rules
prevailing before the adoption of the Tort Liability Law coincide with
A’s ideal point, the new general statute will revise these rules only if
A’s preference has changed since the old rules were adopted. These
revisions should reflect A’s preference change. Second, when the
rules prevailing before the adoption of the Tort Liability Law do not
coincide with A’s ideal point, the new general statute may revise
these rules, even if no preference has changed since the old rules were
adopted. In addition, the revision will make at least one of L and A
better off.
V.

Applying to the Law of Torts in China

This Part applies the analytical framework described in Part
III to the law in China regarding some special torts. Special torts are
107

This implies that, in our one-dimensional policy space, N’s position, relative to
G’s, would be no more favorable to the tortfeasors at any level of populist pressure.
The literature on the people’s congresses seems to support this assumption. The
deputies are found to play the role of remonstrators and challenge the interests of
industrial groups in the name of constituents. For further discussion, see Kevin J.
O’Brien, Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People’s
Congress Deputies, 1994 China Q. 359, 372-374 (explaining that while taking on
the sub-role of remonstrator, the deputies “blend” it with their role as state agents
to better ensure policy implementation against industrial groups, which pose harms
to both constituent and state interests).
108
But the General Principles can still be used as a benchmark to evaluate the
effects of political influence and populist pressure on the formation of the Tort
Liability Law.
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of great interest to this study because the tortfeasors and victims lack
reciprocity in many of these cases. As mentioned before, the interest
groups are usually the tortfeasors whereas the masses are the victims.
Consequently, in special torts, it is easier to pinpoint the source of
political influence and the target of populist pressure. As the
differences observed in the cross-sectional comparisons of rules
governing such torts cannot be readily attributed to other factors with
across-the-board impact on the development of the Chinese tort
law, 109 they lend support to the central argument of this paper.
A.
1.

Cross-Type Comparisons
The Benchmark for Comparison

A consistent benchmark is needed for comparisons between
different types of torts because they can be subject to different rules
even without the impacts of political influence or populist pressure.
I use the General Principles as the benchmark, and evaluate the
effects of the two determinants of our interest by gauging the
deviation of the subsequent rules from this benchmark in either a protortfeasor or pro-victim directions. The General Principles is chosen
for two reasons.
First, the provisions of the General Principles incorporated a
primary constraint on making private laws in China, i.e. the civil law
tradition advocating academic input in legislation. The legal
academia was actively involved in the drafting of the General
Principles. Four eminent civil law scholars served on the expert
advisory committee, 110 and one of them later chaired the drafting

109

See Wei Zhang, The Evolution of the Law of Torts in China: The Growth of a
Liability System, in PRIVATE LAW IN CHINA AND TAIWAN: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSES (Wen Yeu Wang, Yun-chien Chang & Wei Shen eds., forthcoming)
(suggesting that one factor with across-the-board impact on the development of the
Chinese tort law is the general trend to better protect tort victims in China).
110
Liang Huixing, Nanwang De 1979-1986: Wei Zhuhe Daoshi Wang Jiafu
Xiansheng Bashi Dashou Er Zuo (难忘的1979-1986: 为祝贺导师王家福先生
八十大寿而作) [The Memorable 1979 to 1986: For Celebrating the 80th
Birthday of My Advisor Jiafu Wang], CHINESE LEGAL SCI. WEBSITE (June 5,
2010), http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showArticle.aspx?id=2665 (last visited Feb. 23,
2016).
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group. 111 As a result, the General Principles was clearly infused with
heritages from the German and the Soviet laws. 112 In this sense,
therefore, the whole policy space delineated in our model is under the
overarching constraint of the civil law tradition of torts.
Second, the General Principles seem to be free from both
strong populist pressure and intense political influence. Based on the
participants’ accounts, the drafting was mainly conducted by the
group composed of the NPC and judiciary officials, as well as law
scholars. This was a clear combination of elitists rather than populists.
Unlike the more recent NPC legislative practices, the solicitation of
feedback on the draft was not open to the general public, but limited
to government agencies and law schools. 113 At the same time, these
accounts also suggest that the government agencies did not have a big
part in the drafting. 114 The minor role of the government agencies
might be a result of their underestimation of the importance of the
law after several decades of a legal vacuum. But it may as well be
imputable to the tight drafting schedule. The first draft of the law was
completed within three months and its official version was submitted
to the NPC one month later. Eventually, the General Principles were
passed merely nine months after drafting commenced. 115 This short
111

Yuan Dingbo & Ma Chang, Jinian Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze
Banbu 20 Zhounian Xueshu Huiyi Juxing, Minfa Tongze Qicaoren 20 Nian Hou
Chong Jushou (纪念中华人民共和国民法通则颁布 20 周年学术会议举行，民
法通则起草人 20 年后重聚首) [Drafters of the General Principles of Civil Law
Reunited at the Academic Conference for the 20th Anniversary of the Promulgation
of the Law], FAZHI RIBAO ( 法 制 日 报 ), [LEGAL DAILY] (Apr. 12, 2006),
http://old.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=25803 (last visited Feb. 23, 2016).
112
Jichun Shi, A Comparison Between The PRC General Principles of Civil Law
and the General Provisions in Traditional Foreign Civil Codes (我国民法通则与
外国传统民法总则的比较), 7 SOC. SCI. (社会科学) 23, 24 (1986).
113
Wei Zhenying, Canjia Minfa Tongze Qicao De Pianduan Huigu (参加民法通
则起草的片段回顾) [Recollection of the Episodes in the Drafting of the General
Principles of Civil Law], REFORMDATA (Apr. 29, 2006),
http://www.reformdata.org/content/20060429/25228.html (last visited Feb. 23,
2016). See also Liang, supra note 105 (detailing how the drafting principles of the
General Principles involved active participation of legal scholars).
114
Wei, supra note 112 (explaining the drafting process of the General Principles
and the minimum involvement of the government agencies).
115
Liang, supra note 110.
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period of time simply did not allow for many rent-seeking efforts.
Consequently, when comparing the trajectories of the various
branches of tort law from their origins in the General Principles, we
can disentangle ourselves from the confounding factor of legal
tradition and sift out the real effects of the two determinants
considered in this paper. To some extent, such a comparison
emulates the “difference-in-differences” strategy applied in
quantitative analysis.
2.

Assessing Political Influence and Populist Pressure

It is challenging to acquire the exact measurements of the two
variables anticipated to explain the difference of tort rules. However,
there is rough yet sensible guidance to assess tortfeasors’ political
influence and the populist pressure mounted against them. As for the
former, the clout of interest groups depends on the groups’ abilities
to contribute to the sustainability and the political agenda of the
regime. Commentators believe that, after the Tiananmen Square
protests in 1989, the Chinese Communist regime has adopted a wide
array of co-opting policies to buy loyalty from the critical
supporters. 116 The success of “a co-optation strategy is a source of
rents.” 117 As a result, those sectors apt to generate rents will have an
upper hand in the race for political influence. 118 Therefore, we expect
116

See, e.g., BRUCE J. DICKSON, RED CAPITALISTS IN CHINA: THE PARTY, PRIVATE
ENTREPRENEURS, AND PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL CHANGE (2003); BRUCE J.
DICKSON, WEALTH INTO POWER: THE COMMUNIST PARTY’S EMBRACE OF CHINA’S
PRIVATE SECTOR (2008) (explaining Chinese authoritarian regime preserved its
power in the process of economic development and capitalization by “strategic cooptation” of entrepreneurs from the private sector); Haber, supra note 72 at 701
(“Far more common than the strategy of terrorizing the leadership of a launching
organization is the strategy of co-opting it by buying its loyalty”).
117
Haber, supra note 72, at 701 (discussing co-optation by presenting the views of
Huntington who believed that “The fact is that there is ‘no representation without
taxation’ and there are no exceptions to this version of the rule.” He continues by
explaining that when “Oil revenues accrue to the state: they therefore increase the
power of the state bureaucracy and, because they reduce or eliminate the need for
taxation, they also reduce the need for the government to solicit the acquiescence
of the public to taxation. The lower the level of taxation, the less reason for publics
to demand representation”).
118
See Victor Shih et al., Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the
Advancement of Central Committee Members in China, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
166, 168 (2012) (confirming that creating short-term rents is more important than
boosting long-term growth to bureaucrat promotion).
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more clout going to the industries whose production technology
allows for easy exclusion of competition with the help of government
regulations. As the resource and energy industries bear exactly this
attribute, 119 they are good candidates to wield deep political influence
on lawmaking. 120 Furthermore, as the CCP has shifted its priority
from class struggle to economic growth in the past thirty years, the
“Finance and Economics xitong” (meaning “system”) within the
Communist regime has taken center stage in national politics. 121
Therefore, those interest groups under its aegis, such as resource and
energy industries, accumulated more political capital than the groups
supervised by other divisions of the government.
Anecdotal evidence abounds as to the political clout of the
energy and resource industries in China. The best-known example is
the familial control over the electricity industry by Li Peng, the
former Premier and NPC Chairman. To add credibility to the
anecdotal evidence, I created an index to evaluate the political
influence of several ministries deeply involved in industrial
operations. The index is based on the political status of their
ministers. The higher the offices held by the ministers after they
became heads of the ministry, the more influential that ministry is in
the political system. By contrast, that a ministry had a non-CCP
minister indicates its relative insignificance in the system. Ultimately,
this index measures the average rank held by the ministers of a
particular ministry. It assumes that the politically promising officials
119

For the state monopoly of the upstream industries and markets in China, see Xi
Li et al., A Model of China’s State Capitalism (Aug. 2015) (working paper),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2061521 (explaining how the
“vertical structure” attribute of Chinese state capitalism led to the phenomenon of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to dominate and control “key upstream industries”
including energy).
120
The political influence of the resource industries and its implication on
economic growth is dubbed as the “resource curse” in the literature. Although
recent studies challenge the causal relationship between the abundance in resources
and authoritarianism, it seems undisputed that the resource industries are more
capable of creating rents for authoritarian regimes. See THAD DUNNING, CRUDE
DEMOCRACY: NATURAL RESOURCE WEALTH AND POLITICAL REGIMES (2008);
Stephen Haber & Victor Menaldo, Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?
A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (2011) (detailing
research and literature supporting a “causal relationship” manifested as a view that
“economic and fiscal reliance on petroleum, natural gas, and minerals create and
perpetuate authoritarian regimes”).
121
Lieberthal, supra note 71, at 228.
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have a better chance to be assigned to those trophy ministries
controlling the government activities critical to the survival of the
regime. While the details of this index can be found in Appendix A,
it is consistent with the proposition that the ministries overseeing vital
economic resources fare better in terms of political clout. In
particular, the ministries in charge of electric power and railway
transportation, compared to those administering health care and
education, are more politically powerful according to the index.
On the other hand, populist pressure against a certain industry
is closely associated with the frequency and intensity of the defective
services provided by this industry, and the former is related further to
the prevalence of the services. Unfortunately, no easy measurements
of the frequency, and the intensity of defects are available. I relied
instead on an indirect measurement—the relative frequencies of key
words related to a particular industry appearing on Sina Weibo, the
most popular microblogging website in China. The details of the
calculation are explained in Appendix B. This measurement entails
several limitations. First, the selection of the key words is arbitrary,
although I tried to test the robustness of the results using different
selections. Second, Sina Weibao was launched only in August 2009
and my key word searches were further confined to the posts
published on or after September 1, 2009. Most of the tort laws in
China were adopted before that time. Therefore, it is assumed that
the relative strengths of populist pressure against the relevant
industries after 2009 and in the early 2000s, when most of the judicial
interpretations on torts were promulgated, are positively correlated.
Third, only those who have access to the Internet are able to write on
Weibo; therefore, the sample selection may be biased. To make up
for these limitations, I will also resort to anecdotal evidence in the
comparisons that follow. Crude as it is, this “key words count”
approach may shed new light on the effect of populism on legislation
in China beyond exclusive dependence on intuition. The key words
counts show that the industries of railway transportation, health care,
and primary and secondary education are under much higher populist
pressure than the electricity industry.
In Table 1, the special torts considered below are classified
according to tortfeasors’ political influence and populist pressure
against them.
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Table 1 Classification of Special Torts

Strong

Populist
Pressure

Weak

Political influence
Strong
Weak
Medical
Railway
Malpractices/School
Accidents
Accidents
Electric
Traffic Accidents
Shocks

Traffic accidents are tabulated at the lower right corner as a
tort of weak influence and weak pressure. This is because, unlike
other special torts, reciprocity exists between tortfeasors and victims
of traffic accidents, especially with the prevalence of passenger cars
in China. In other words, there is no readily identifiable group of
tortfeasors in traffic accidents, let alone a government ministry
representing their interests. Thus, no organized interests would press
for rules favoring tortfeasors. 122 At the same time, public grievance
against the drivers is mild. As Table B shows, traffic accidents are
relatively far from the center of Chinese Internet users’ attention,
suggesting weak populist pressure against tortfeasors.
3.

Railway Accidents vs. Electric Shocks

As stated above, both the railway and electricity industries
hold strong political influence. However, while the former is also
under strong populist pressure, the latter is much less pressured by
the general public.
Under Article 123 of the General Principles, railway
transportation and high voltage electricity are deemed as highly
122
Since China adopted no-fault insurance, the insurer will have to pay
compensation after a traffic accident, up to a limit, regardless of the applicable
liability rules. Therefore, the insurance industry does not have an interest in protortfeasor rules. Arguably, pro-tortfeasor rules would benefit the automobile
industry as lower liabilities induce more driving, hence promoting the sales of cars.
In China, however, car sales have been robust since 2000. The quarterly salesoutput ratio never falls below 96% (data source: National Bureau of Statistics).
Thus, the automobile industry is in little need of expanding sales through the

manipulation of tort law.
See 汽 车 产 销 率 _ 累 计 值 （ ％ )
http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=B01.
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dangerous operations (gaodu weixian zuoye).
Hence, both are
subject to the strict liability rule, and the only defense to liability is
intentional action by victims. 123 Nevertheless, the trajectories of
lawmaking diverge thereafter.
Under Article 58 of the Railway Law (Tielu Fa), a special
statute enacted in 1990, railway companies can exempt their tort
liability completely when personal injuries are caused by “victims’
own reason.” 124 This immunity clearly includes victims’ negligence
and probably even their health conditions or physical features.
The SPC adopted two judicial interpretations regarding
railway accidents, respectively, in 1994 and 2010. The 1994 SPC
Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Adjudication of
Cases Involving Compensation for Railway Transportation
Accidents (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Tielu Yunshu
Sunhai Peichang Anjian Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi, hereinafter
“Interpretation on Railway Compensation”), 125 defers completely to
the Railway Law to immunize railway companies where injuries are
caused by victims’ actions. 126 This was replaced by the more recent
judicial interpretation, the SPC Interpretation on Several Issues
Concerning the Application of Law in Adjudicating Cases Involving
Disputes over Compensation for Personal Injuries in Railway
Transportation (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Tielu Yunshu
Renshen Sunhai Peichang Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Falü Ruogan Wenti
De Jieshi, hereinafter “Interpretation on Railway Personal
Injuries”). 127
In this judicial interpretation, the SPC restricts
123

MinFa Tongze (民法通则) [General Principles of Civil Law] (promulgated by
the Fourth Session of the Sixthby the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective
Jan. 1, 1987), art. 123. Besides, the comparative negligence defense under Article
131 of the General Principles is meant to be applicable to abnormally dangerous
activities.
124

Tielu Fa (铁路法) [Railway Law] (promulgated at the Fifteenth Session of the
Seventh Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sep. 7, 1990, effective May. 1,
1991)
125
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Tielu Yunshu Sunhai Peichang Anjian
Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理铁路运输损害赔偿案件若干
问题的解释) [the SPC Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the
Adjudication of Cases Involving Compensation for Railway Transportation
Accidents] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Oct. 27, 1994).
126
Interpretation on Railway Compensation, art. 11.
127
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Tielu Yunshu Renshen Sunhai Peichang
Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Falü Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理铁
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immunity to injuries caused by force majeure or victims’ intentional
actions, including lying on tracks, collision with trains, 128 crossing
junctions, and walking or sitting on rail tracks ignoring the signal or
railway staff’s alert. 129 As for victims’ negligent or other intentional
actions conducted after unpermitted entries into railway working
areas (e.g. tracks, stations or trains), based on the degree of victims’
fault, railway companies are to bear 20% to 80% of the liability if
they did not fully fulfill their duties of care, or 10% to 20% of the
liability when they executed those duties. 130 Furthermore, railway
companies’ liabilities will be no lower than 50% or 40% when the
victim is a legally incompetent or restrictively competent person,
respectively. 131 Finally, Article 13 of the Interpretation on Railway
Personal Injuries imposes a complementary liability on railway
companies when the injury is caused directly by a third party. 132 As
a result, the railway companies need to step in and compensate the
victims if the third party who has caused the harm fails to pay
damages. For certain types of third-party actions from outside the
trains, such as throwing stones or hitting the train, the railway
companies should compensate the victims first and seek indemnity
from the third party thereafter.
Although railway companies’ liability was ratcheted up under
the latest judicial interpretation, on balance, it still appears lenient to
tortfeasors in comparison to the rule set in the General Principles.
The current law provides railway companies with the additional
immunity of force majeure and holds them liable for third-party-

路 运 输 人 身 损 害 赔 偿 纠 纷 案 件 适 用 法 律 若 干 问 题 的 解 释 ) [The SPC
Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Adjudicating
Cases Involving Disputes over Compensation for Personal Injuries in Railway
Transportation] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 3, 2010, effective Mar.
16, 2010), art. 16.
128
Id. at art. 5(2).
129
Id. at art. 7. Under this article, railway companies need to prove that they have
fully discharged the duty of care to be immunized from tort liability.
130
Id. at art. 6.
131
Id. at art. 8. A legally incompetent person is a minor under ten years of age, or
a person with mental impairment who is unable to comprehend his or her conduct.
A restrictively competent person is a minor from ten to eighteen years of age, or a
person with mental impairment unable to fully comprehend his or her conduct.
Nat’l People’s Cong., supra note 117, art. 11, 12, 13.
132
Interpretation on Railway Personal Injuries art. 5(1) and art. 13.
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caused injuries only complementarily in most situations. 133 In cases
of victims’ negligence, the General Principles arguably held railway
companies 100% liable, 134 yet the judicial interpretation now reduces
railway companies’ liabilities to as low as 10% if they are not
negligent and no more than 80% even if they themselves are also
negligent. 135 Admittedly, for a small part of victims’ intentional
actions, railway companies’ tort liability is raised under the judicial
interpretation, yet to a seemingly marginal extent. Railway
companies will be liable for at most 20% of the damages when they
are not negligent. 136 Even when they are, since, relative to their
negligence, victims’ intention would be viewed as a more serious
fault, railway companies’ share of liability is very likely to be below
50%.
When it comes to high voltage electric shock accidents, the
relevant special statute is the Electric Power Law (Dianli Fa) of
1995. 137 In addition to force majeure, it accords full immunity to
electric companies engaging in high voltage operations when victims
are at fault, meaning intentional as well as negligent actions. 138 At the
same time, when the injury from an electric shock is caused by a third
party, electric companies are not required to pay damages at all. 139
In 2001, the SPC issued the SPC Interpretation on Several
Issues in Adjudication of Cases Concerning Personal Injuries Caused
by Electric Shocks (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Chudian
Renshen Sunhai Peichang Anjian Ruo Gan Wenti De Jieshi,
hereinafter as “Interpretation on Electric Shocks”). 140 It restricted
133

Id.
The comparative negligence defense might apply according to Article 131 of the
General Principles. However, under Article 2 of the Interpretation on Personal
Injuries, tortfeasors strictly liable for tortious actions, such as railway companies,
are generally allowed to claim this defense only if the victim is grossly negligent,
a limitation unseen in the latest judicial interpretation on railway accidents.
135
Id.
136
Interpretation on Railway Personal Injuries art. 6(2)
134

137

Dianli Fa (电力法) [Electric Power Law] (promulgated at the Seventeenth
Session of the Eighth Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 1995, effective Apr. 1,
1996).
138
Id. at art. 60.
139
Id.
140
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Chudian Renshen Sunhai Peichang
Anjian Ruo Gan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理触电人身损害赔偿案
件若干问题的解释) [The SPC Interpretation on Several Issues in Adjudication of
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electric companies’ strict liability under the General Principles in
three aspects. First, Article 2 of this judicial interpretation held
electric companies liable only if they were owners of the electric
facilities.
Second, Article 3 of this judicial interpretation provided
electric companies with complete immunity in four situations: 1)
force majeure, 2) victims’ suicidal or self-wounding behaviors, 3)
victims’ criminal actions such as electric larceny, 4) victims’ actions
inside the electric facility reservation areas and forbidden by laws or
administrative regulations. Among these four, the last situation is
especially effective in protecting electric companies because many
electric shocks happen inside the reservation areas and, according to
Articles 53 and 54 of the Electric Power Law, any action inside these
areas without approval from the electric power management authority
almost certainly falls into this category.
Third, where the electric company owns the facility and is not
entitled to the above immunities, Article 2 of the Interpretation on
Electric Shocks apportions liability among the parties involved
according to the degree of causality between their actions and the
injury. When comparing the causality, the court can theoretically
reduce the tortfeasor’s liability even without determining the victim’s
negligence. Since the judicial interpretation does not change the
provision of the Electric Power Law forbidding victims to claim
damages from electric companies when a third party caused the injury,
electric companies do not have to compensate victims before they
seek indemnities from the third party.
Comparing the rules of these two types of torts, 141 we can
clearly see that, while the special statutes were equally keen on
tampering with the strict liability rules of the General Principles by
expanding the immunities and defenses, the judicial interpretations
obviously took a softer position against electric companies. When
the victim enters electric companies’ working areas without
permission and engages in prohibited activities, electric companies
enjoy complete immunity while railway companies are held strictly
Cases Concerning Personal Injuries Caused by Electric Shocks] (promulgated by
Sup. People’s Ct., effective Jan. 10, 2001) (repealed 2013).
141
Since both torts were subject to the same article of the General Principles, a
direct comparison of the related special statues and judicial interpretations suffices
to tell the difference in their respective deviations from the benchmark.
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liable for 10% to 20% of the damages. In addition, railway
companies’ proportion of liability can rise to as high as 80% if they
are found to be negligent. Also, electric companies are not subject to
the minimum liability requirements, as railway companies are, in case
of injuries suffered by incompetent or restrictively competent victims.
Moreover, unlike electric companies’ full immunity, railway
companies can be liable for harms caused by third parties. Finally,
the ownership requirement and causality comparisons are available
only to electric companies. However, it is worth noting that these
differences are largely due to the judicial interpretation on railway
accidents passed in 2010, whereas the earlier version did not frown at
the approach taken by the special statute to reduce railway companies’
liabilities.
These observations are consistent with the model presented in
Part III. The special statutes were enacted mostly in the first half of
the 1990s when populist pressure had yet to exert influence on policy
choices. Thus, the government agencies in charge of the legislation
managed to insert provisions more favorable to tortfeasors than those
under the General Principles, and the judicial interpretations then
enacted were likewise pro-tortfeasor. Populist pressure against
electric companies remains moderate, thanks mainly to the low
frequency of high voltage shocks and the isolation of the related
injuries. In contrast, China’s railway system has been under immense
pressure after a series of severe accidents. For example, in April 2008,
two trains hit each other following a derailment, killing seventy-two
people and injuring over 400. 142 Quite conceivably, populist pressure
caused a preference change among the CCP leaders. In the aftermath,
the adopted judicial interpretation on railway accidents became less
pro-tortfeasor than the special statute. 143 In contrast, without the same
142

Xinhua News Agency, Jiaoji Tielu Tebie Zhongda Jiaotong Shigu Queren
Yunanzhe 72 Ren (胶济铁路特别重大交通事故确认遇难者 72 人) [72 Deaths
Confirmed in the Catastrophic Traffic Accident on the Jiaoji Railway],
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-05/03/content_8093877.htm (May 3,
2008).
143
Indeed, with the further escalation of populist pressure in the aftermath of a
disastrous high-speed train collision claiming 40 lives on July 23, 2011, even the
special statute was revised more pro-victim to repeal the excessively low
compensation limits for railway accidents, see Tielu Jiaotong Shigu Yingji Jiuyuan
He Diaocha Chuli Tiaoli ( 铁 路 交 通 事 故 应 急 救 援 和 调 查 处 理 条 例 )
[Administrative Regulation on Emergency Rescue in and Investigation and
Handling of Railway Traffic Accidents] (promulgated by St. Council, Nov. 9, 2012,
effective Jan. 1, 2013) (originally enacted as Regulation of June 27, 2007).
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populist pressure, the judicial interpretation on electric shocks took a
position similar to the special statute in terms of offering extra
protection to tortfeasors. In other words, Figure 1 and Figure 2
approximate the situations of the electric shock law and the railway
accident law, respectively. 144
Under the Tort Liability Law, the two types of torts are again
subject to one provision. Article 73 of the law immunizes railway
and electric companies from tort liability for injuries caused by
victims’ intentional actions or force majeure. Victims’ negligence,
on the other hand, merely reduces the companies’ liability. Since the
judicial interpretation contains rules more specific than the Tort
Liability Law, it remains an important guidance to court decisions,
even after the implementation of the Tort Liability Law. Regarding
railway accidents, the judicial interpretation and the general statute
hold consistent views and complement each other. Given the
closeness in time of the adoption of these rules, they were essentially
passed according to the same set of preferences of the CCP leadership,
so it is not surprising to see compatible rules, as my model would
predict.
On the other hand, the Interpretation on Electric Shocks was
repealed in April 2013 after the implementation of the Tort Liability
Law. Under the new law’s approach, victims’ negligence can reduce
electric companies’ tort liability, but the companies are no longer
entitled to certain favorable protections, such as the ownership
requirement and causality comparison. Despite the rule change,
electric companies are nonetheless better protected than their railway
counterparts in that no minimum liability is required for the former
and that harm caused by third parties is immunized completely. 145
Hence, populist pressure does seem to make a difference where
tortfeasors have likewise strong political influence.
Though there is no good reason to believe that the leadership’s
preferences have shifted due to populist pressure, the rules of high
144

My model does not explain what motivated the SPC’s adoption of the
Interpretation on Electric Shocks five years after the passage of the Electric Power
Law in the absence of preference changes of the Party leadership. Concerns outside
the policy space of our interest might account for this action, such as encouraging
nationwide uniformity in adjudication. Instead, the model predicts that, within the
policy space, the position of the law on electric shocks should not move, which is
virtually in line with our observation.
145
Interpretation on Electric Shocks, art. 2.
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voltage electric shocks nevertheless have begun to favor
victimstortfeasor. Before the Tort Liability Law, the rules were
probably located at G’s, rather than A’s, ideal position. Therefore, it
is possible that the general statute can push the rules in the pro-victim
direction, even without the preference change. Figure 4 illustrates
this possibility.
Figure 4 Adoption of General Statutes Without Preference Changes

Pro-victim

gp

c

a

n l

sq(g)

Pro-tortfeasor

Figure 4 is almost the same as Figure 1, but the status quo
becomes G’s ideal position, g, because that was the rule prevailing
before the Tort Liability Law. Accordingly, I use gp to indicate the
position of the General Principles. The most important change in
Figure 4 is the addition of n, the NPC Standing Committee’s preferred
position. The location of n satisfies the following conditions: 14) na < sq-a; 15) l-n < sq-l; and 16) l-n < l-a. Given condition 14, once
N proposes n, A will approve it. Due to condition 15, L is ready to
open the lawmaking process when it foresees the outcome will be n.
However, under condition 16, L will not commence a second round
because it expects the result of that round to be a. Thus, the rules
move toward the pro-victim end without a change of preference in
either A or L. 146 In this case, the new rule makes both A and L better
off.
4.

Medical Malpractices/School Accidents vs. Railway
Accidents

Now, we compare medical malpractice and school injuries
with railway accidents. The tortfeasors of these torts are confronted
146

Indeed, condition 16 is unnecessary to this outcome. Once conditions 14 and 15
are satisfied, the new general statute always moves toward the pro-victim end. The
only difference is that the new law will be located at “a,” rather than “n,” when
condition 16 is not met. The situation illustrated in Figure 4, however, does not
mean that populist pressure plays no part in determining the position of the law.
Since no populist pressure pushes L’s or A’s ideal point toward the pro-victim end,
“n” cannot be excessively pro-victim. In particular, condition 15 must be satisfied,
which explains why the Tort Liability Law permits more generous treatment of
electric companies compared to railways.
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similarly with strong populist pressure, yet they may have different
degrees of political influence.
Under the General Principles, medical malpractice is a regular
tort and is subject to the negligence rule. Plaintiffs must to prove the
negligence of medical institutions in order to claim damages for
medical malpractice. This rule was inherited in two special statutes:
the Measures for Handling Medical Accidents (Yiliao Shigu Chuli
Banfa, hereinafter as “Medical Accident Measures”) and the later
Regulation on the Handling of Medical Accidents (Yiliao Shigu Chuli
Tiaoli, hereinafter as “Medical Accident Regulation”), both adopted
by the State Council in 1987 and 2002, respectively. 147 In the
Interpretation on Evidence, however, the burden is shifted to medical
institutions to prove lack of negligence or causation between the
relevant medical treatment and injuries. 148 In other words, the SPC
applies res ipsa loquitur to medical malpractice. 149 The special
statutes merely regulate medical errors or lapses amounting to
medical accidents that lead to both civil liability and administrative
sanctions. Hence, in theory, a mistake in treatment not held to be a
medical accident can nevertheless be held as negligence, resulting in
tort damages.
In terms of the scope of compensation, the General Principles
include only a sketchy provision. In contrast, the Medical Accident
Regulation includes itemized standards for assessment of
compensation. 150 However, these rules are distinct from the more
recent SPC Interpretation on Application of Law in Adjudication of
Cases of Personal Injuries (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli
147

Yiliao Shigu Chuli Tiaoli (医疗事故处理条例) [Medical Accident
Regulation] (promulgated by the St. Council, Apr. 4, 2002, effective Sept. 1,
2002) ST. COUNCIL GAZ.,
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61445.htm; Yiliao Shigu Chuli
Banfa (医疗事故处理办法) (Medical Accident Measures) (promulgated and
effective by the St. Council, June 29, 1987)
148
Interpretation on Evidence, art. 4 (8).
149
In practice, the key evidence in medical malpractice litigations is the inspection
report on “medical errors.” The Medical Accident Regulation demands the
inspection to be conducted by medical review boards, whereas the judicial
interpretation does not touch on the inspection institution. Patients usually prefer
judicial inspections implemented by non-medical institutions, yet hospitals strongly
question the professional expertise of these institutions. See Liebman, supra note
3, at 195-203 (discussing the contests on inspection institutions).
150
Medical Accident Regulation, art. 50.
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Renshen Sunhai Peichang Anjian Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi,
hereinafter “Interpretation on Personal Injuries”) effective since
2004. 151 Generally speaking, the victims of medical malpractice will
receive substantially greater compensation under the SPC
interpretation, especially in death cases. 152 To solve the conflict
between the different bodies of rules about medical malpractice, the
SPC issued the Notice on Adjudication of Civil Disputes over
Medical Malpractices Referring to the Regulations on Handling of
Medical Accidents (Guanyu Canzhao “Yiliao Shigu Chuli Tiaoli”
Shenli Yiliao Jiufen Minshi Anjian De Tongzhi) in 2003, stipulating
that the Medical Accident Regulation should apply only to medical
accidents while the General Principles should govern incidents that
constitute malpractice not amounting to accidents. Although this
notice came out before the Interpretation on Personal Injuries, the
later judicial interpretation would nonetheless determine the scope of
compensation in non-accident malpractice cases because of its
general application to personal injury disputes covered by the General
Principles. Therefore, the so-called “dual-track” (eryuanhua) of
compensation arises in medical malpractice cases.
Some
commentators pointed out the anomalous consequence under this
dual-track system that the amount of compensation could be higher
for the less serious malpractices not qualified as medical accidents. 153
151

Interpretation on Personal Injuries, art.19-29.
Although the Interpretation on Personal Injuries itself does not provide for
damages for pain and suffering, the SPC Interpretation of the Supreme People's
Court on Problems regarding the Ascertainment of Compensation Liability for
Emotional Damages in Civil Torts, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Queding
Minshi Qinquan Jingshen Sunhai Peichang Zeren Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高
人民法院关于确定民事侵权精神损害赔偿责任若干问题的解释)
[Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Problems regarding the
Ascertainment of Compensation Liability for Emotional Damages in Civil Torts]
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 8, 2001, effective Mar. 10, 2001)
allows for such damages. Courts frequently award both the death indemnity and
the damages for pain and suffering in death cases when the Interpretation on
Personal Injuries is applied. The combined amount of these two items is much
higher than the damages for pain and suffering acknowledged in the Medical
Accident Regulation, which is capped at six times the average annual living
expenses of local residents. In Shanghai, for instance, the death indemnity alone
can be as high as 803,760 RMB yuan (about $130,400) for urban residents using
the 2012 standard, while six times the average annual living expenses of Shanghai
urban residents in 2012 is merely 104,406 RMB yuan (about $17,000).
153
THE CIVIL LAW OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF THE NPC
STANDING COMMITTEE (hereinafter as “CIVIL LAW OFFICE”), QINQUAN ZEREN FA
152
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The Medical Accident Regulation of 2002 is considered more
pro-victim than its predecessor adopted fifteen years earlier. For one
thing, the new administrative regulation expands the definition of
“medical accident” beyond the malpractices causing the most serious
injuries under the old one. 154 For another, the itemized compensation
rules took the place of the older provision of one-time and capped
damages. 155 However, the two legal documents promulgated in 2002,
the Medical Accident Regulation and the Interpretation on Evidence,
were inconsistent about the liability rules applicable to medical
institutions. One continued with the negligence rule while the other
introduced res ipsa loquitur, which might suggest the Party leaders’
ambiguous attitudes toward medical malpractice at that time. This
being said, the actual difference is perhaps smaller than it appears. In
any event, the Medical Accident Regulation says nothing directly
about the burden of proof, and it does not insist that patients should
always initiate the critical proving process – the expert inspection by
the medical review board. Indeed, courts can follow the judicial
interpretation by requiring hospitals to apply for the review and make
them bear the expenses according to the Medical Accident
Regulation. 156 With regard to the dual-track compensation problem,
it is probably less dramatic in practice than commentators believe.
Above all, courts rarely award higher damages in cases where
hospitals’ negligent practices do not amount to medical accidents. 157
Moreover, even before the Tort Liability Law officially united the
two tracks, abundant court decisions adopted the standard of the

LIFA BEIJING YU GUANDIAN QUANJI [THE COMPLETE COLLECTION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND AND OPINIONS OF THE TORT LIABILITY LAW], 740
(2010).
154
Medical Accident Regulation, art. 2.
155
Medical Accident Measures, art. 18; CIVIL LAW OFFICE, supra note 148, at 740.
156
According to Article 34 of the Medical Accident Regulation, hospitals will bear
the cost of proof if they apply for the review. Medical Accident Regulation, art. 34.
157
In my study on the publicized court decisions on medical malpractices made in
Shanghai in 2011 and 2012, the average amount of damages awarded in cases of
non-accident malpractices is considerably lower than in cases of medical accidents,
both in absolute value and as a percentage of the plaintiff’s claim (the difference in
absolute value is nearly 150,000 RMB and the percentage difference is about 40%).
The differences are statistically significant at the 1% level, and present even if we
only compare the cases involving the disputes occurring before the Tort Liability
Law took effect.
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judicial interpretation to evaluate damages, especially about the
disability indemnity. 158
The public discontent with medical services continued to
ferment after the early 2000s. In fact, many Chinese judges believe
that, together with land takings and employment disputes, medical
malpractice is one of the three major origins of public petitions
against the Chinese judiciary. 159 At the same time, many disputes
resulted in violence, causing injury or even death to medical
professionals. These violent incidents have become a potential threat
to social stability. 160 Against this complex backdrop, the Tort
Liability Law has taken a mixed position toward medical malpractice,
indicating the CCP leadership’s preference for some kind of balance
between the public anger against medical services and the
profession’s grievances against medical mobs.
On one hand, the Tort Liability Law confirms res ipsa loquitur
employed in the judicial interpretation, but limits its usage to three
situations: where hospitals 1) violate the provisions of law,
administrative regulations or other regulatory rules on medical
practices; 2) conceal or decline to present medical records related to
the dispute; or 3) falsify, tamper with or destroy medical records. 161
The rest of medical malpractice is still subject to the negligence
rule. 162 On the other hand, the Tort Liability Law also substantially
restricts hospitals’ immunities. 163 In particular, even when patients’
or their relatives’ non-cooperative behaviors have contributed to the
negative consequences of treatment, hospitals are not exempt from
tort liability if they are also at fault, which is an outright revision of
the previous rule of full immunity in the case of patients’ fault. The
E.g. Yuan v. PRC No. 411 Hospital, （2011）虹民一（民）初字第 3867 号;
Lu v. Shanghai A Hospital, （2011）闽民一（民）初字第 7227 号.
159
Interview by author with Judge ZC, in Shanghai, China, (July 9, 2013).
160
A widely reported case of medical disturbance before the passage of the Tort
Liability Law was the Fujian Nanping incident. See Wei Dong, Nanping “Yinao”
Shijian Shishifeifei [Rights and Wrongs of the Nanping Medical Disturbance
Incident], China Youth Daily (June 29, 2009), http://zqb.cyol.com/content/200906/29/content_2731661.htm (reporting a story of violence between a man’s family
and the hospital where he died). See generally, Liebman, supra note 3.
161
Qianquan Zeren Fa (侵权责任法) [Tort Liability Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective Jul. 1, 2010) 2009
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., art. 58.
162
Id. at art. 54.
163
Article 60 of the law only allows for three immunities, whereas the Medical
Accident Regulation contains six. Medical Accident Regulation, art. 33.
158
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new general statute also expands hospitals’ duties through other
channels. For instance, regarding injuries due to transmission of
contaminated blood, Article 59 of the law allows victims to claim
damages from hospitals, even if the latter is not at fault. Although
hospitals can seek indemnity from blood providers afterwards, such
indemnity will not be realized without difficulty. 164 Finally, the Tort
Liability Law ends the anomaly of dual-track compensation. 165 This
means that, after the new law takes effect, assessment of damages in
medical malpractice cases should follow the more generous standard
in the Interpretation on Personal Injuries.
We now turn to injuries occurring at primary or secondary
schools. The General Principles do not mention schools’ liability to
minor students for injuries arising on their premises. The SPC first
set forth a rule in the SPC Opinions, requiring schools to “provide
appropriate compensation” if they are at fault for the injuries suffered
by minors without legal competence. 166 In 2002, the Ministry of
Education also held schools liable for students’ injuries when they are
at fault, though with several immunities. 167 Later on, the SPC
expanded schools’ liability to cover all minors, whether incompetent
or restrictively competent, in 2003. 168 Under these rules, schools will
be liable when they breach the duty of care in discharging their
responsibilities of managing the campus or protecting and educating
the students. In addition, according to the Interpretation on Personal
Injuries, schools bear complementary liability for injuries inflicted by
external personnel on minor students in proportion to their fault in
managing the campus. This means that schools should be liable if the

164

CIVIL LAW OFFICE, supra note 148, at 808.
WANG, supra note 15, at 307.
166
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Guanche Zhixing <Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Minfa Tongze> Ruogan Wenti De Yijian (Shixing) (最高人民法院
关于贯彻执行《中华人民共和国民法通则》若干问题的意见(试行)) [The
SPC Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Implementation of the General
Principles of the Civil Law (For Trial Implementation)] (promulgated by the Sup.
People’s Ct., Jan. 26, 1988), art. 160.
167
Xuesheng Shanghai Shigu Chuli Banfa (学生伤害事故处理办法) [Measures
for Handling of Student Injury Accidents] (promulgated by the Dep’t of Educ. of
China, June 25, 2002, effective Sept.1, 2002) art. 8, art. 12, art. 13. This department
rule ceased to be effective in 2010.
168
Interpretation on Personal Injuries, art. 7.
165
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external personnel causing the injuries cannot bear the tort liability in
full or is judgment-proof.
In a country with a stringent family planning policy, it is
unsurprising that school safety has attracted great social attention.
The department rules and the judicial interpretation came out in 2002,
and the 2003 expansion of liability could well be understood as a
reflection of such attention. Although the department rules imposed
a variety of conditions on pursuing liabilities toward schools, the
provision of the judicial interpretation is rather straightforward,
probably consistent with the Party leadership’s preferences at that
moment. However, the number of school injuries did not reduce
thereafter. In 2007, the Ministry of Education released the first
governmental report on the safety situations of primary and
secondary schools, admitting the increase of the on-campus injuries
during the previous years. 169 This was also confirmed by the number
of insurance claims associated with school injuries in Beijing. 170
Therefore, the law continues to evolve under the constant populist
pressure toward school accidents.
Instead of applying the uniform negligence rule, the Tort
Liability Law distinguishes injuries to students of complete
incompetence from those to students of restrictive competence.
Whereas the negligence rule remains for the latter, res ipsa loquitur
now applies to the former. 171 Consequently, where completely
incompetent (i.e. younger) students are injured, schools will have to
prove that they were not negligent in carrying out their duties. It is
worth noting that schools’ liabilities are strengthened despite the
practical difficulties in establishing a full-scale school liability
insurance scheme. 172 Therefore, it is less likely a consequence of the
development of the insurance market than a response to the evergrowing public concern over campus security. Moreover, schools’
complementary liability is kept in Article 40 of this new general
statute.

2006 Nian Quanguo Zhongxiaoxue Anquan Xingshi Fenxi Baogao (2006 年全
国中小学安全形势分析报告) [National Report on the Safety Situation of Primary
and Secondary Schools, 2006], CHINA EDUC. DAILY (Mar. 22, 2007),
http://www.jyb.cn/cm/jycm/beijing/zgjyb/2b/t20070322_71880.htm.
170
The number of claims rose from 273 in 2004 to 368 in 2006. See CIVIL LAW
OFFICE, supra note 134, at 658-59.
171
Tort Liability Law, supra note 156, art. 38-39.
172
WANG, supra note 15, at 210.
169
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In cases of medical malpractice and school accidents, the law
started leaning toward victims in the early 2000s and turning more
pro-victim than the General Principles—likely as a result of populist
pressure. These changes are conforming to the situation depicted in
Figure 3. But the momentum of populist pressure remained high and
pushed for further adaption of the law. The subsequent rule
adjustments in the general statute can thus be thought of as geared
toward the updated policy preferences held by the decision-makers of
the CCP under the new sociopolitical environment.
Like the Chinese railway companies, hospitals and schools
have been the center of populist pressure, yet the ministries running
hospitals and schools do not have the political clout comparable to
the Ministry of Railways. Accordingly, the tort law rules have also
followed different tracks of evolvement. With respect to railway
accidents, although populist pressure forced the rules away from the
highly biased special statute, overall they still favor tortfeasors when
compared to our benchmark, the General Principles. As elaborated
in the previous subsection, the original strict liability rule under the
General Principles has been chipped away in a variety of aspects so
that the applicable rules became closer to an ordinary negligence test.
By contrast, when it comes to medical malpractice or school
accidents, the current rules are patently harsher to tortfeasors than the
General Principles. Neither hospitals nor schools were subject to res
ipsa loquitur under the earlier general statute. Nevertheless, this
severe rule applies to both in the latest general statute. In addition,
both are now liable, in one way or another, for injuries caused directly
by a third party. In sum, here we see the liability rule passing through
the benchmark of negligence and approaching strict liability. This
comparison, therefore, evinces the impact of political clout when
tortfeasors are confronted with high populist pressure.
5.

Traffic Accidents vs. Medical Malpractices/School
Accidents

Traffic accidents are like medical malpractice and school
injuries in that the tortfeasors lack strong political influence.
However, unlike the other two categories of torts, the reciprocity
existing between victims and tortfeasors moves traffic accidents
outside the focus of populist pressure.
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The General Principles do not have provisions dealing
specifically with traffic accidents. However, most tort law scholars
in China agree that operation of motor vehicles is one of the
abnormally dangerous activities specified under Article 123 of the
statute, to which strict liability is applicable, with the only immunity
being victims’ intentional acts. 173 Since it is impractical to impose
strict liability simultaneously on two motor vehicle drivers colliding
with each other, this liability rule is appropriate only in cases where
the accident involves both motorists and pedestrians or nonmotorists. 174
The NPC Standing Committee passed the Road Traffic Safety
Law (Daolu Jiaotong Anquan Fa, hereinafter “Safety Law”) in 2003.
In the initial version of the law, in accidents involving motorists and
pedestrians or non-motorists, the former would be fully liable for
damages in excess of the coverage provided by the mandatory traffic
insurance unless they could prove that pedestrians or non-motorists
had violated traffic rules and that the motorist had taken “necessary
and proper measures” to avoid accidents, in which case their liability
would be reduced. In effect, strict liability was reaffirmed because
motorists are the ultimate bearer of harm insofar as pedestrians or
non-motorists are not negligent. 175
The currently applicable rules to traffic accidents were
established in the amendment to the Safety Law in 2007. Article 76
of the Safety Law first stipulates that motorists are liable in accidents
involving motorists and pedestrians or non-motorists if the latter are
not at fault. It then allows motorists’ liability to be reduced, like
Article 131 of the General Principles, when victims are proven to be
negligent. The thrust of the rule is again strict liability because
motorists are still the ultimate bearer of harm. However, ambiguity
arises from to the last part of this article, where it states that motorists
should bear no more than 10% of the liability if they are not at fault. 176
This last part will be consistent with the strict liability rule if it applies
173

XINBAO ZHANG, QINQUAN ZEREN FA YUANLI (侵权责任法原理) [PRINCIPLES
OF THE TORT LIABILITY LAW] 348 (2004). Victims’ negligence was supposed to

reduce tortfeasors’ liability. See supra note 124.
174
Accidents involving multiple motor vehicles are always subject to the
comparative negligence rule.
175
“Ultimate bearer of harm” is a term borrowed from COOTER & ULEN, supra note
36, at 212 (referring to the party bearing the harm of accidents when nobody is
negligent).
176
Safety Law, art. 76.
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only in the situation where the motorist is not negligent and the
pedestrian or non-motorist is. But without this limitation, Article 76
would be mainly a rule of res ipsa loquitur. It turns out that the first
reading of the article is not only supported by China’s eminent tort
law scholars 177 but is also the position taken by the vast majority of
the provincial regulations on traffic accidents. 178
Article 48 of the Tort Liability Law simply refers to the Safety
Law for determining the liability in traffic accidents, and the latest
judicial interpretation does not make any change to the rule. 179 It is
therefore proper to assert that, as for traffic accidents between
motorists and pedestrians or non-motorists, strict liability is the
prevailing rule in China at present.
The provisions about traffic accident liability are
characterized by their similarity to the benchmark rules under the
General Principles. Indeed, the stance of strict liability has been
maintained almost entirely. In particular, when pedestrians or nonmotorists are not at fault, motorists will be liable, even if the actual
cause of the accident is force majeure or a third party. In this sense,
of all the abnormally dangerous activities, motorists’ liabilities are
the closest to the strict liability rule under Article 123 of the General
Principles. Considering the dearth of both political influence and
populist pressure in traffic accidents, this closeness is not at all
unexpected since we noted that the General Principles itself was
enacted with relatively little impact of either factor.

177

E.g. Xinbao Zhang, Daolu Jiaotong Shigu Zeren Guize Yuanze De Yanjin Yu
“Daolu Jiaotong Anquan Fa” Di 76 Tiao (道路交通事故责任规则原则的严谨与
“道路交通安全法”第七十六条) [The Evolvement of the Liability Rule of Traffic
Accidents and the Article 76 of the Road Traffic Safety Law],
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=23523. See also BIXIN JIANG,
DAOLU JIAOTONG SHIGU SUNHAI PEICHANG [THE ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
DAMAGE COMPENSATION] 4 (2014).
178
Of the twenty-six provinces that have included the relevant rules in their
provincial regulations, twenty-three have essentially established the strict liability
rule for motorists.
179
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Daolu Jiaotong Shigu Sunhai Peichang
Anjian Shiyong Falv Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理道路交通
事故 损害 赔偿案件适用法律若干 问题的解 释) [The SPC Interpretation on
Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Traffic Accident
Compensation Cases] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 27, 2012,
effective Dec. 21, 2012).
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Another unique aspect of traffic accidents is that they belong
to an area of special torts where the general statutes, the special
statute, and the judicial interpretation appear to converge. This is
foreseeable when neither political influence nor populist pressure
plays a vital role in formulating the liability rules. In such
circumstances, the tastes of the various lawmaking institutions are
less affected by the two determinants of interest in this analysis.
Consequently, other considerations, be it fairness, efficiency, or legal
tradition, rise in importance in the course of legislation.
The characteristics of traffic accidents stand out saliently
when compared to medical malpractice or school accidents, the other
two types of torts with tortfeasors of weak political influence. Under
strong populist pressure, the extant rules concerning the latter two
have evolved to a more pro-victim position than the General
Principles. Moreover, in both of these areas, the liability rules in the
special statutes designed by the government ministries are clearly less
favorable to victims than those from the judicial interpretations and
the Tort Liability Law, because victims are assigned a heavier burden
of proof or a wider range of immunities are allowed. Given
tortfeasors’ similarly weak political clout, these differences are
indicative of the effects of populist pressure on cultivating the
preferences of key players of lawmaking, as well as the creation of
the equilibrium outcomes of this process.
6.

Traffic Accidents vs. Electric Shocks

The last cross-type comparison is between traffic accidents
and electric shocks. In both areas, populist pressure is supposedly
insignificant, but the tortfeasors are more politically powerful in one
case than the other.
I elaborated in the previous subsection that, with regard to
motorists’ liabilities against pedestrians or non-motorists, the current
rules of Chinese law are close to the provisions in the General
Principles, the benchmark of our comparison. In particular, motorists’
immunity is limited to victims’ intentional actions. Force majeure
and third parties’ actions are not even included. In other words,
motorists are required to bear stricter liability than other tortfeasors
of abnormally dangerous activities, including electric companies.
On the other hand, as we have seen in subsection 3, rules
governing electric companies’ tort liabilities in cases of electric
shocks had been much more favorable to tortfeasors than the original
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provisions in the General Principles until recently. Even after the
implementation of the Tort Liability Law, the relevant special statute
remains effective thereby completely immunizing electric companies
from injuries caused by third parties or force majeure.
The comparison between traffic accidents and electric shocks
thus demonstrates that where populist pressure is mild, tortfeasors’
political influence can be decisive to the position of tort liability rules.
The more influential the tortfeasors are, the more likely the law would
be pulled closer to their preferred locus. Indeed, although the rules
now applicable to traffic accidents do not seem far from the General
Principles, this has not always been the case. The mutation of the
rules might as well be a consequence of the demotion of an average
motorist’s political status.
B.
1.

Intra-Type Comparisons

The Evolution of the Traffic Accident Law

In section A, I have shown that, according to the Safety Law,
motorists are subject to strict liability in accidents involving motor
vehicles and pedestrians or non-motorists. However, this was not the
case for a substantial amount of time since the promulgation of the
General Principles. In 1991, the State Council enacted the Measures
for Handling Road Traffic Accidents (Daolu Jiaotong Shigu Chuli
Banfa, hereinafter “Traffic Accident Measures”), the first special
statute on traffic accidents. Articles 17 and 19 of the Traffic Accident
Measures basically adopted a comparative negligence rule to handle
accidents occurring not only between motor vehicles, but also
between motor vehicles and pedestrians or non-motorized vehicles.
Thus, the parties in traffic accidents should be liable according to the
extent of their negligence. 180 At the same time, Article 44 of the
Traffic Accident Measures restricted motorists’ strict liability to no
more than 10% of damages and only in accidents causing death or
serious injuries. 181
Interestingly, the trajectory of the traffic accident law in China
features an initial pro-tortfeasor movement in disregard of strict
180

More accurately, the Traffic Accident Measures looked to the parties’ violations
of the traffic rules and deemed such violations as negligence per se.
181
The amount of damages was capped at the average living expenses of ten months.
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liability under the General Principles and later returns to this origin.
This trajectory appears to be correlated with the prevalence of private
car ownership in this country.
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As Figure 5 and Figure 6 show, the total number and
percentage of privately owned vehicles in China have risen sharply
in the 2000s. In particular, the share of private cars in civilian
vehicles first exceeded 50% in 2003 when the Safety Law was passed.
This growth pattern of private vehicles suggests that the reciprocity
between traffic accident victims and tortfeasors is a relatively recent
phenomenon. In the 1990s, before the pronounced surge of private
car ownership, vehicles were more likely to be owned by public

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss2/1

2016]

UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TORTS IN CHINA 231

institutions or enterprises, and motorists were usually employees of
these public entities. At that time, in accidents involving motorists
and pedestrians or non-motorists, tortfeasors were, on average, more
influential politically than the victims. It is unsurprising that the law
was biased in motorists’ favor in light of the theory advanced in this
paper. After the substantial increase in private car ownership,
however, the composition of motorists became diverse.
Consequently, the benefit from lobbying for a pro-tortfeasor law
diffused broadly among the general population and curbed the
enthusiasm to press for such a law, even for the small proportion of
public car owners. This phenomenon probably explains why the
liability rule of traffic accidents traversed through comparative
negligence before coming back to strict liability, as increasingly more
people turn out to drive on the road.
In passing, it should be noted that the comparison in this
subsection is longitudinal and could not be controlled for factors other
than political clout that might have caused changes to the law over
time. For example, the rule adjustment in 2003 could be a
consequence of the general trend to expand the protection of tort
victims. 182 Furthermore, the dip in tortfeasors’ political influence
does not account for the slightly less victim-friendly amendment to
the Safety Law in 2007, although it has probably brought the rules
even closer to the General Principles. 183

182

Zhang, supra note 109. Nor did the comparison control the populist pressure on
traffic accident disputes while the law was evolving. Thus, it is possible that the
pro-victim movement of the law in the 2000s was fostered jointly by the decline of
tortfeasors’ political prestige and the surge of populist pressure against the
privileged motorists.
Daolu Jiaotong Anquan Fa (中华人民共和国道路交通安全法 (2007 修正))
[Road Traffic Safety Law of the People's Republic of China (2007 Amendment)]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 2007,
effective May 1, 2011). Under the Safety Law of 2003, to reduce their liability,
motorists had to prove both the victim’s negligence and their own innocence,
whereas the latter no longer needs to be proven after the amendment, which makes
the rule similar to comparative negligence under Article 131 of the General
Principles.
183
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2.

The Special Treatment of Zoos

Under the General Principles, injuries caused by domesticated
animals are regarded as a type of special tort. Article 127 of the law
holds animal keepers or managers strictly liable unless they can prove
that the injury was the victim’s fault. Noticeably, the General
Principles does not distinguish zoos from individual animal keepers
in terms of assigning liability. To a large extent, the Tort Liability
Law inherited this article, but with two important alterations. The
first alteration narrowed the scope of immunity conferred on animal
keepers. Currently, in order to avoid or even reduce liability, animal
keepers will have to prove that the injuries were caused by victims’
intentional or grossly negligent actions. In other words, victims’
ordinary negligence is no longer a defense to animal keepers’
liabilities. 184
Whereas the new law has tightened the tort liability for
ordinary animal keepers, 185 it has loosened the liability for zoos.
Article 81 of the Tort Liability Law allows zoos to be exempt from
tort liabilities insofar as they can prove that they have discharged their
duty of management, even when the victims are not at fault. In brief,
when the injuries are caused by zoo animals, victims become the
ultimate bearers of harm. But in situations involving individual
animal keepers, the animal keeper will bear the ultimate harm when
nobody is at fault; indeed, the animal keeper is liable even if the
victim is in ordinary negligence.
This patent imbalance between zoos and individual animal
keepers was not unnoticed in the drafting process of the Tort Liability
Law. It was pointed out that zoos were usually for-profit, so no good
justification could be found for their reduced tort liability. 186
Regardless, the provision survived in the final version of the law.
However, this result is again unsurprising in light of the political
economy of lawmaking. Unlike ordinary pet owners, zoos in China
Qinquan Zeren Fa (侵权责任法) [Tort Liability Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. of the Eleventh Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009), art. 78.
185
This change essentially reiterates the position taken by Article 2 of the
Interpretation on Personal Injuries adopted in 2003, which is generally applicable
to all strict liability cases. See supra text accompanying note 124 (describing the
use of the comparative negligence defense). Therefore, it is likely a reflection of
the global expansion of victim protection. See Zhang, supra note 104 (arguing that
the prevalent trend in tort law is expansion of protection for tort victims).
186
CIVIL LAW OFFICE, supra note 148, at 146.
184
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are public enterprises operated by local government agencies. The
Chinese Association of Zoological Gardens was established in 1985
to represent the zoos nationwide. Currently, it is under the
supervision of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Development. 187
In contrast, there is no family pet owners’ organization at the national
level to date. Hence, the difference in political influence between
zoos and ordinary family animal owners is conceivable. Although
the zoos, as well as the government agencies overseeing their
operations, are certainly not as politically prestigious as the ministries
controlling railway transportation or electricity, they are probably
also exposed to much less populist pressure. 188 Consequently, the
interest group lobbying might have affected the drafters of the law
behind the scenes, and the rule in zoos’ favor snuck into the new
statute without stirring up much public dissatisfaction.
3.

The Exceptional Protection of Marine Environment
Polluters

Tort liability for environmental pollution is provided in
Article 124 of the General Principles, and the strict liability rule has
been applied ever since. However, the polluters of marine
environments are entitled to certain unique protections unavailable to
other kinds of polluters. According to Article 68 of the Tort Liability
Law, when the pollution is attributable to a third party, including both
intentional and negligent actions, victims can claim damages either
from the polluter or the third party ultimately responsible for the
pollution. In other words, the Tort Liability Law does not allow
polluters to use third party actions as a defense to victims’
compensation claims. 189 Most of the special statutes on pollution also

187

CHINESE ASSOCIATION OF ZOOLOGICAL GARDENS,
http://www.cazg.org.cn/cazgintro/cazgintro.aspx?name=21 (last visited Mar. 11,
2016).
188
Based on the key words count in Appendix B, animal-related injuries are
generally not of high public attention.
Qinquan Zeren Fa (侵权责任法) [Tort Liability Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. of the Eleventh Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009), Chapter
VIII Liability for Environmental Pollution. Polluters can seek indemnity from the
third party after compensating the victims.
189
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take a position consistent with the Tort Liability Law. 190 But there is
one exception to this rule reserved for polluters of oceans. Under
Article 90 of the Marine Environment Protection Law (Haiyang
Huanjing Baohu Fa), when the pollution of marine environment is
attributable to a third party’s intentional or negligent actions, the third
party will be liable for the damages. Noticeably, this article remains
in the latest amendment to the Marine Environment Protection Law
of 2013. Therefore, it preempts the Tort Liability Law both as a
special law and a newer one.
The exceptional protection of ocean polluters appears
puzzling, especially when we notice that such protection is even
beyond the requirement of the relevant international treaty to which
China is a party. 191 However, if we look at this exception from the
political economy perspective, it becomes readily understandable.
The prominent sources of ocean pollution is the leakage of oil tankers
in the course of oil exploration and production. In China, both oil
production and shipping are controlled by giant SOEs. 192 Not only do
they have a concentrated benefit in lobbying for favorable liability
rules, but they also have tremendous political influence as members
of the energy industry key to the national economy. These
advantages are unavailable to other polluters, who are usually more
diffuse and less politically eminent. Indeed, a recent study shows that
large SOEs, such as the China National Petroliam Corporation
(CNPC), are always able to avoid paying significant compensation in

190

See, e.g., Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa (水污染防治法) [Law of Prevention and
Control of Water Pollution] (promulgated by the Standing Comm., Nat’l People’s
Cong., Feb. 28, 2008, effective June 1, 2008), art. 85 (detailing the circumstances
in which the polluter is required to eliminate the damage and compensate the
victims for losses suffered). Most other special statutes do not have a specific article
about the polluter’s defense of third party actions, so the general provision of the
Tort Liability Law will apply.
191
Under Article 3 of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, the owner of a ship is not liable for oil pollution only if a third
party’s intentional action or omission caused the pollution. International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, art. 3, June 19, 1975, 973
U.N.T.S. 14097.
192
For instance, the China Shipping Group boasts an annual oil-shipping capacity
of eighty million tons, which is about a quarter of China’s annual oil import in
2012 (data source: National Bureau of Statistics)
http://www.cnshipping.com/ywybw/hyzy/ypys/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 25,
2015).
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accidents of pollution, thanks to their political clout. 193 In addition,
unlike air or water pollution more detectable by ordinary citizens,
ocean pollution is less striking to most people because of the
remoteness of the pollution sites. As a result, populist pressure is
possibly weaker toward ocean pollution than other forms of pollution,
which seems to be the case according to Appendix B. Consequently,
the tortfeasors’ strong political influence, coupled with weak populist
pressure, provides a reasonable explanation for the extraordinary
favoritism toward ocean polluters in Chinese tort law.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have identified two determinants of the rules
concerning special torts in China and presented a simple spatial
model demonstrating the mechanism through which these
determinants have affected tort law within China’s power framework.
My analysis pointed out the central role of the CCP leadership in
shaping the rules of torts, as well as its preferences under the
counteractive impacts of tortfeasors’ political clout and the populist
pressure on these tortfeasors. Ultimately, the survival requirements
of the authoritarian regime have brought these determinants to the
forefront of lawmaking in torts. While organized interest groups
excel at maneuvering the policy orientation in China, just as in
democracies, the CCP’s recent governance strategy enables the
otherwise muffled voices of tort victims to be heard in the course of
legislation.
In particular, my research suggests that, when tortfeasors’
political influence is kept constant, the populist pressure on the
tortfeasor group tended to push tort law toward favoring victims. In
contrast, with similar populist pressure, the politically influential
tortfeasors could steer legal rules to their advantage. Even within a
specific type of tort, the subgroup of tortfeasors that was better
organized to exert political influence would be rewarded with more
favorable tort rules than their fellow tortfeasors, especially where
populist pressure was moderate.

193

See Jing Leng, Cong Zhongda Huanjing Shigu Kan Zhongguo Guoyou Qiye De
Shehui Zeren [Looking at the Social Responsibilities of Chinese SOEs from the
Major Environmental Accidents] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
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Of course, there are limits to my study. I do not attempt to
assert that the political economy perspective employed in this
research is sufficient for a comprehensive understanding of the law
of torts in China. Instead, I restricted my explorations to the special
torts involving relatively definite and distinct groups of tortfeasors,
for these are the fields of law where political factors are most likely
to leave their footprint. This means that the vast sphere of regular
torts were not under the scrutiny of this analysis. Even for the special
torts within the scope of this study, the crudeness of the
measurements of the key variables renders my application of the
theory reliant on anecdotal knowledge and personal impression.
Moreover, the lack of transparency in China’s political process
reduces, to some extent, the description of its lawmaking apparatuses
to an educated guess. Finally, despite its conscientious design, the
qualitative nature of the study could not fully control the confounding
factors acting on the formation of the Chinese tort law.
Alternative explanations might be conceivable for any of the
aforementioned variations in the law of torts. A coherent and general
theory on the rules regarding a variety of torts, however, is more
advisable than ad hoc accounts of the law in a particular area in view
of advancing our holistic knowledge of lawmaking. After all, the
purpose of this research is to call academic attention to the political
economy underlying the specific provisions of Chinese law, which,
by and large, seems to have been left out of the scholarly agenda so
far. I hope my study will inspire more efforts among students of
Chinese law to explore the operation of law at the microscopic level
against the macroscopic institutional backdrop of this country.
Appendix A: Political Influence Index for Some Ministries
This index was constructed according to the highest CCP or
government positions held by the head of the ministries in charge of
operating the related industries. Ministers in office from 1949 to
March 2013, when the last cabinet of the Hu-Wen administration
stepped down, were included in the index compilation, and the
positions they held were recorded up to October 2014. 194 Tier 1
194

The Ministry of Electric Power Industry was first formed in 1955, so its
ministers from 1955 to March 2013 were covered by the index. However, the
ministers who held above-ministerial level positions when becoming ministers
were not included in the index, for they were usually staffed to handle anomalous
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leaders refer to members of the Standing Committee of the CCP
Politburo, President of the PRC, Premier of the State Council,
Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, or Chairman of the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
National Committee. Tier 2 leaders refer to members of the CCP
Politburo. 195 Tier 3 leaders refer to Vice President of the PRC, Vice
Premier of the State Council, State Councilor, Vice Chairman of the
NPC Standing Committee, Vice Chairman of the CPPCC National
Committee, President of the SPC, or President of the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate. Non-CCP ministers are ministers who are
not a CCP member when in office. For every ministry, each minister
was counted only once, even when he or she had multiple offices of
the same tier. 196 The index values were calculated using the formula
below, and a higher value indicates higher influence:
Index Value =

# of Tier 1 Leaders∗3+# of Tier 2 Leaders∗2+# of Tier 3 Leaders∗1–# of Non−CCP Ministers∗1
# of Ministers

situations, such as public health crises or massive upheavals, hence not indicative
of the ministries’ regular political importance. An alternative index was
constructed using ministers in the reform era from 1978. No qualitative difference
was found in terms of the strength of political influence among the ministries.
195
According to a resolution passed on the 12th CCP National Congress, the
members of the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Advisory Commission
were conferred with the same political privileges as the Politburo members.
Therefore, they were counted as Politburo members in the index.
196
However, if a person served as minister of multiple ministries, he or she would
be repeatedly counted in compiling the index for each ministry. Besides, a nonCCP minister holding a tier 3 leader’s office was counted both as a non-CCP
ministry and a tier 3 leader (no non-CCP minister ever served as a tier 1 or tier 2
leader).
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Table A Political Influence Index for Some Ministries

Industry Operated

Primary/Secondary
Education

Electricity

Health
Railway

Name of
Ministry
Ministry of
Education,
State
Education
Commission
Ministry of
Electric Power
Industry,
Ministry of
Water
Conservancy
and Electric
Power, State
Economic and
Trade
Commission,
National
Development
and Reform
Commission
Ministry of
Health
Ministry of
Railway

# of
Ministers

# of
Tier 1
Leaders

# of
Tier 2
Leaders

# of
Tier 3
Leaders

# of NonCCP
Ministers

Index
Value

12

0

0

3

2

0.08

10

1

1

4

1

0.8

11

0

0

2

2

0

13

1

2

3

0

0.77

Appendix B: Key Words Count for Certain Types of Special
Torts
The key words count is based on the microblogs posted on
Sina Weibo from September 1, 2009 through January 15, 2014 (i.e. a
total of 1598 days). The mean of average daily percentages is the
mean of the average daily number of microblogs containing the key
words related to a particular type of torts, 197 as a percentage of the
total number of the microblogs on Sina Weibo, during the covered
period of time. A higher mean suggests a stronger populist pressure
against the tortfeasors of the particular type of tort. Specifically, this
value was calculated as follows:

197

To reduce the impact of outliers, only the key words appearing in no less than
100 days during the covered period were included in the calculation.
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Mean of Average Daily Percentages =

𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑁𝑁∗1598
𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑

1598
∑𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1 ∑𝑑𝑑=1

∗

100%,
where N is number of key words searched pertaining to a type of torts,
B dn the number of microblogs containing the nth key word on the dth
day, and W d the total number of microblogs on Sina Weibo on the dth
day. 198
Table B Key Words Count for Certain Types of Special Torts
Types of Torts

School Accidents

Electric Shocks

Mean of Average Daily
Percentages

Key Words
primary school
(xiaoxue), secondary
school (zhongxue),
primary and secondary
school (zhongxiaoxue),
kindergarten
(you’eryuan), Ministry
of Education (jiaoyubu),
campus safety (xiaoyuan
anquan)
electric power (dianli),
state power grid (guojia
dianwang), power supply
bureau (gongdianju),
electric shock (chudian)

0.249%

0.031%

198
As a simplified illustration, suppose we search two key words pertaining to a
certain type of torts within two days. The counts are indicated in the table below.
Then the mean of average daily percentages for this type of torts is calculated as
300
200
80
+
+
+0
50,000 35,000 50,000

2∗2

Key Word
1
Key Word
2

* 100% = 0.33%.

Day 1
# of
Microblogs
Total # of
Containing
Microblogs
the Key Word
(Wd)
(Bdn)
300

Day 2
# of
Microblogs
Total # of
Containing
Microblogs
the Key Word
(Wd)
(Bdn)
200

50,000
80
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Medical Malpractices

Railway Accidents

Traffic Accidents

Injuries by Domestic
Animals

Environmental Pollution
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electric power (dianli),
state power grid (guojia
dianwang), power supply
bureau (gongdianju),
electric shock accident
(chudian shigu)
clinic (zhensuo), hospital
(yiyuan), Ministry of
Health (weishengbu),
doctor-patient
relationship (yihuan
guanxi), medical
treatment (yiliao)
clinic (zhensuo), hospital
(yiyuan), Ministry of
Health (weishengbu),
doctor-patient
relationship (yihuan
guanxi), medical
accident (yiliao shigu)
high-speed railway
(gaotie), railway (tielu),
train (huoche), rail motor
car (dongche), Ministry
of Railway (tiedaobu)
high-speed railway
(gaotie), train (huoche),
rail motor car (dongche),
railway bureau (tieluju),
Ministry of Railway
(tiedaobu), railway
accident (tielu shigu)
traffic accident (jiaotong
shigu), motor vehicle
accident (jidongche
shigu)
injuries by animals
(dongwu shangren), zoo
(dongwuyuan)
environmental pollution
(huanjing wuran), ocean
pollution (haiyang
wuran), water pollution
(shui wuran), air
pollution (daqi wuran),
PM 2.5, solid waste
pollution (guti feiwu
wuran)

0.030%

0.427%

0.327%

0.306%

0.265%

0.0099%

0.0158%

0.00181%
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air pollution (daqi
wuran), PM 2.5
water pollution (shui
wuran)
ocean pollution (haiyang
wuran)
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0.00104%
0.00357%
0.000123%

